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"[W]e make no finding either on many other issues that may arise
under Article XXIV. The resolution of those other issues must
await another day." WTO Appellate Body Report on European
Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R, para. 65 (April 7,2004).
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1996 and 2001, World Trade Organization (WTO) Members
affirmed a commitment to actively address the issues surrounding trade
facilitation in the sphere of customs procedures and enforcement of
Members' municipal customs laws.! In March of 2005, the WTO
authorized constitution of a panel to resolve a dispute alleging the
European Community's (EC) constituent states disparately enforce the
EC's Uniform Customs Code.2 The United States claims its exporters,
particularly small and medium companies, are unable to resort to a central
European customs administration to remediate inconsistent application of
the Uniform Customs Code.'

1. See generallyWorld Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration of 14 Nov. 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 27 (Nov. 20, 2001); WTO Singapore Ministerial Declaration of 18 Dec.
1996, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, M20-23 (Dec. 18, 1996).
2. WTO Secretariat, Note on Constitutionofthe PanelEstablishedat Request ofthe United
States, EuropeanCommunities-Selected Customs Matters, WT/DS315/9 (May 30, 2005).

3. Request

for

Establishment of a

Panel

by the

United States,

European

Communities-Selected Customs Matters, WT/DS315/8 (Jan. 14, 2005) [hereinafter Panel

Establishment Request].

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss2/1

2

Erskine: The U.S.-EC Dispute over Custom Matters: Trade Facilitation, Cust

THE U.&-EC DISPUTE OVER CUSTOMMAMTERS

The dispute not only brings the necessity for a uniform WTO
agreement on trade facilitation to the fore, but also emphasizes the
apparent inconsistency between the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) Article X's mandate for WTO Members to uniformly,
impartially, and reasonably administer municipal customs laws and Article
XXIV's allowance of individual members of a customs union to
substantially apply common commercial regulations and laws in relation
to non-members of the customs union.4
This Article, divided into five parts, analyzes the U.S.-EC dispute, the
relationship between GATT Articles X and XXIV, and discusses the role
of trade facilitation in providing a sustainable solution to the issues raised
in the dispute. Part II presents the background of the dispute. Part II
describes the allegations raised under Article X:3(a) and (b) in the
American request for constitution of a WTO panel in light of EC
Community law, as well as addresses the relationship between Article X
and Article XXIV. Part IV considers measures necessary to promote trade
facilitation, and asserts the essentiality of formal bilateral cooperation
between the United States and EC in respect to customs matters. Part V
recounts the solutions proposed by this work, namely an agreement
between WTO Members on the understanding of the relationship between
the obligations of Article X and Article XXIV and the conclusion of a
bilateral treaty between the United States and EC concerning
harmonization of customs procedures and classification.
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE DISPUTE

On September 21, 2004 the United States requested consultations to
address "the non-uniform administration by the European Communities of
laws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative
rulings... pertaining to the classification and valuation of products for
customs purposes and to requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on
imports."5 The United States asserted the EC failed to establish
4. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 188, 194
[hereinafter GAIT 1947], amended by Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 155 [hereinafter Agreement Establishing WTO] and
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187 (1994)
[hereinafter GAT 1994].
5. Request for Consultations by the United States, European Communities-Selected
Customs Matters, WT/DS315/1, G/L/694, 1 (Sept. 27, 2004) [hereinafter European
Communities-Selected Customs Matters]; WTO Dispute Settlement Proceeding Regarding
European Communities-Selected Customs Matters, 69 Fed. Reg. 6450-60451 (Oct. 8,2004); see
WTO Agreement, Understandingon Rules andProceduresGoverningthe Settlement ofDisputes,
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administrative and judicial fora to address inconsistent application of the
EC's common external tariff scheme and trade regulations related to
customs matters.6 Citing the EC regulations and the EC Uniform Customs
Code, the United States asserted the discretion permitted national customs
authorities to administer these EC laws resulted in disparate application of
supposedly uniform EC laws.7 The United States asserted the EC Uniform
Customs Code provided for Member States to establish an appeal process
to review customs determinations, and that such a law permitted widely
varying procedures for appeal of a custom authority's decision in different
Member States.8 Further, appellate review at the community level occurred
only after exhaustion of a Member State's internal legal system's
remedies, causing substantial delay in resolving incorrect classification
decisions.'
Additionally, the United States asserted that community delegation to
national customs authorities for implementation of the EC common
external tariff resulted in varying procedures for entry of goods, valuation,
tariff classification, assessment of penalties, "different certificate of origin
requirements, different criteria among Member States for the physical
inspection of goods, different licensing requirements for importation of
food products, and different procedures for processing express delivery
shipments."' The United States claimed the practical delegation of
community authority resulted in conduct that violated the EC's WTO
obligations articulated in Article X:3(a) and (b), which are:
3. (a) Each contracting party shall administer in a uniform,
impartial and reasonable manner all its laws, regulations, decisions
and rulings of the kind described in paragraph 1 of this Article.
(b) Each contracting party shall maintain, or institute as soon as
practicable, judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or
procedures for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and
correction of administrative action relating to customs matters.
Such tribunals or procedures shall be independent of the agencies
entrusted with administrative enforcement and their decisions shall
33 I.L.M. 1226, art. 4 [hereinafter DSU]; see also Rossella Brevetti & Joe Kirwin, Customs: US.
Files WTO Complaint Against Inconsistent EU Customs Administration, 21 INT'L TRADE REP.
(BNA) 1548 (Sept. 23, 2004).
6. European Communities-Selected Customs Matters, supra note 5, at 3.
7. Id.at 2.
8. Id.
9. Id. (review by a Community organ of a classification decision usually follows years after
initial challenge of the decision).
10. Id.
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be implemented by, and shall govern the practice of, such agencies
unless an appeal is lodged with a court or tribunal of superior
jurisdiction within the time prescribed for appeals to be lodged by
importers; Providedthat the central administration of such agency
may take steps to obtain a review of the matter in another
proceeding if there is good cause to believe that the decision is
inconsistent with established principles of law or the actual facts."
In requesting consultations, the United States sought a prompt
resolution to its complaints from the EC. 2 Further, the United States
hoped to assist small and medium sized businesses, which "often lack the
resources to work their way through Member State and EU bureaucracies
in order to reconcile inconsistencies in classification or valuation in
different States."' 3 By invocation of the Doha Declaration's goal of
enhancing trade facilitation, the United States viewed its request as
furthering the Declaration's aims.1 4 Finally, the United States sought a
systematic solution to the disparate administration of EC customs laws and
lack of prompt judicial or administrative review at the community level. 5
Australia, Japan, Brazil, Argentina, the Separate Customs Territory of
Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu, and India requested to join the
consultations.16 Each asserted it conducted a substantial amount of export
11. GATT 1947, supra note 4, art. X:3(a). The United States also alleges a violation of
Article X: 1. This aspect of the U.S. WTO action is not addressed in the present work due to a desire
to focus the discussion as articulated in the Introduction. Article X: 1requires the publication of all
laws, regulations, administrative decisions, and judicial rulings relating to "classification or the
valuation of products for customs purposes, or to rates of duty, taxes or other charges, or to
requirements, restrictions or prohibitions on imports or exports or on the transfer of payments
therefore [sic], or affecting their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing
inspection, exhibition, processing, mixing or other use." GATT 1947, supra note 4, art. X:1. The
Article applies the publication requirement to treaties regarding trade policy entered into by a
Member. See id.

12. Press Release, Office ofLU.S. Trade Representative, US Files WTO CaseAgainst EUOver
European Customs System (Sept. 21, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_

Library/PressReleases/2004/September/USFilesWTOCase Against EUOverEuropean_
CustomsSystem.html (last visited June 20, 2005).
13. Id.
See also U.S. Trade Representative, Small Business Trade Policy Agenda, Opening
the Global Marketplace for Small Business (addressing goal of reduction of tariffs and combating
inconsistent administration of customs regulations by foreign governments), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/Fact_Sheets/2004/assetuploadfile578_6758.pdf
(last visited June 20, 2005).

14. Press Release, supra note 12.
15. Id.
16. See Request to Join Consultations, European Communities-Selected Customs Matters,

WT/DS315/2 (Oct. 8, 2004); Request to Join Consultations, European Communities-Selected

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

5

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 1

FLORIDA JOURNAL OFINTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18

trade to the EC justifying its admission to the consultations. 7 Yet, the EC
denied these nations admission."
The U.S. Trade Representative announced three distinct reasons for
initiating consultations with the EC. 9 The first reason stressed the recent
expansion of the EC from fifteen Member States to twenty-five.2 ° Thus,
the problem of lack of uniform administration of EC customs law
increased with the additional members joining the EC in May of 2004.21
The Representative believed addressing the issue early on in the
enlargement process would help to ensure continued export levels from the
United States to the EC, which were $155.2 billion in 2003.22
The second reason for instituting the consultations focused on
advancing the Doha Agenda's mandate to achieve greater trade facilitation
or reduction of administrative burdens on importers. 23 As the third reason,
the Representative asserted the ineffectiveness of combating the EC's lack
of uniform administration on an individual basis through negotiations with
the EC Trade Commissioner, and the failure of the EC to systematically
allocate resources to resolve the issues raised by the Americans. 4
The EC responded to the American request to establish a panel by
noting that the United States had failed to raise its concerns in more
appropriate bilateral or multilateral venues. 25 Further, the EC asserted that
during consultations the United States failed to evidence a "single example
of real and practical problems for U.S. operators resulting from the
application of EC customs measures."26 In response to the allegation that

Customs Matters, WT/DS315/3 (Oct. 8, 2004); Request to Join Consultations, European
Communities-Selected Customs Matters, WT/DS315/4 (Oct. 11, 2004); Request to Join
Consultations, EuropeanCommunities-SelectedCustoms Matters,WT/DS315/5 (Oct. 11,2004);
Request to Join Consultations, EuropeanCommunities-SelectedCustoms Matters, WT/DS315/6
(Oct. 12, 2004); Request to Join Consultants,EuropeanCommunities-Selected Customs Matters
WT/DS315/7 (Oct. 12, 2004).
17. See supra note 16.
18. Gary G. Yerkey, Customs: U.S. Asks to Set Up Panelto Rule in Dispute With EU Over
Customs Procedures, 22 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 78 (Jan. 20, 2005) (quoting U.S. Trade
Representative as indicating that consultations confirmed concerns, and European Commission's
spokeswoman describing U.S. complaint as without a legal basis).
19. Press Release, supranote 12.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Press Release, supranote 12.
25. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes, WT/DSB/M/1 82, 31 (Feb. 17, 2005).
26. Id.(citing only three submissions received by the U.S. Trade Representative in response
to Federal Register Notice).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss2/1
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the EC violated Article X:3(a) and (b), the EC asserted the American
argument that the EC needed to create a central customs administration,
as well as centralized judicial and administrative tribunals on the
community level to replace national procedures, amounted to a challenge,
far outside the scope of WTO review, of the EC's internal distribution of
competencies by domestic legislation. 7 The EC contended its Member
States presently enforced a harmonized regulatory regime across the
Community under the supervision of the European Commission and
European Court of Justice.28
Predictably, consultations did not remedy the situation, and the United
States requested the establishment of a panel to adjudicate the suspected
violations of WTO law by the EC.29 The Dispute Settlement Body initially
rejected the American request in February 2005.30 Pursuant to Article 6.1
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), the Dispute Settlement
Body may, with the consensus of the Members, deny a request to establish
a panel.3 ' The second American request met with success in March322005
with the establishment of a panel by the Dispute Settlement Body.
In the request to establish a panel, the United States asserted two
breaches of WTO law by the EC.33 The first echoed the request for
consultations in stating the EC failed to administer its customs
classification and valuation, as well as its requirements, restrictions, and
prohibitions on imports in an impartial, reasonable, and uniform manner,
in violation of Article X:3(a) 4 Secondly, the failure of the EC to maintain
or institute judicial, arbitral, or administrative tribunals with

27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Panel Establishment Request, supra note 3, at 1-2; WTO Dispute Settlement Proceeding
Regarding European Communities-Selected Customs Matters, 70 Fed. Reg. 18448-18449 (Apr.
11, 2005).
30. Dispute Settlement Body, supra note 25, 32; Daniel Pruzin, Customs: EUBlocks WTO
Panel on US. Complaint that EUCustosPractices Lack Uniformity, 22 INT'LTRADE REP. (BNA)
142 (Jan. 27, 2005).
31. DSU, supra note 5, art. 6.1.
32. Dispute Settlement Body, supra note 25, 30 (Mar. 21, 2005); WTO Secretariat (Note
on Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the United States), European
Communities-Selected Customs Matters, WT/DS315/9, 1 (May 30, 2005) (establishing panel
and electing members); Daniel Pruzin, Customs: WTO Established Dispute Panel to Rule on
Customs Practices by European Union, 22 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 469 (Mar. 24, 2005).
33. Panel Establishment Request, supra note 3, at 1; cf supra note 11 (indicating United
States also claimed breach of Art. X:I, which is not discussed in this Article).
34. Panel Establishment Request, supra note 3, at 1.
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accompanying procedures to promptly address customs matters at the

community level constituted a violation of Article X:3(b).3
The United States placed particular emphasis on its first claim of
violation of Article X:3(a). Arguing the separate EC Member States'
custom authorities administered the Customs Code and its accompanying
regulations in "numerous different forms," the United States delineated
certain areas most illustrative of the lack of uniform, impartial, and
unreasonable administration of EC customs regulations.36 There areas
were:
classification and valuation of goods; procedures for the
classification and valuation of goods, including the provision of
binding classification and valuation information to importers;
procedures for the entry and release of goods, including different
certificate of origin requirements, different criteria among member
States for the physical inspection of goods, different licensing
requirements for importation of food products, and different
procedures for processing express delivery shipments; procedures
for auditing entry statements after goods are released into the
stream of commerce in the European Communities; penalties and
procedures regarding the imposition of penalties for violation of
customs rules; and record-keeping requirements."

Further evidence of the lack of uniformity in customs matters concerned
the municipal laws, regulations, manuals, and administrative practices of
the nations comprising the EC.38
Elaborating on its second claim, the United States declared that the lack
of efficient appellate review within the EC Member States resulted in no
effective community-wide review, which failed to meet the requirements
of Article X:3(b). 39 The failure to establish procedures for appeals of
national customs authorities' decisions to EC tribunals, as required by the
Customs Code, further evidenced the EC's failure to meet its Article
X:3(b) obligations.'
35. Id. at 2.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Panel Establishment Request, supra note 3.
40. Id. (citing Articles 243 through 246 ofthe Customs Code ofthe European Union). Article
245 provides for implementation of appellate procedures by the Member States, while Article 243
dictates appeal shall be in the first instance to the customs authority of the Member States and then
to an independent body within the Member States. See Council Regulation (EEC) 2913/92,

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss2/1
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In response to the American claims, the EC reiterated its previous
arguments affirming EC measures were WTO compliant. 4 Additionally,
the EC noted the United States failed to engage in any meaningful
discussions addressing the American concerns over the EC customs
administration.42 The EC asserted the request for a panel concerned
"questions regarding the distribution of competences in the administration
of customs rules within the internal legal order of a WTO Member which
had gone well beyond what was required by the WTO rules."43 Despite the
EC's belief that the American request failed to allege any factual or legal
basis for its claims, the EC acquiesced to the American request to establish
a panel. '
1I. VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE X:3(A) AND (B)?

An opportunity exists, within the context of the U.S. complaint against
the EC, to clarify GATT/WTO law regarding the extent to which a
customs union need apply its common external tariff scheme in a uniform,
impartial, and reasonable manner pursuant to Article X. Determination of
whether the EC's administration of its customs laws violates Article X
begins with the general principles defining the scope of a Member's
obligations under the Article's provisions. Analysis of past WTO disputes

where similar conduct constituted a breach of Article X illustrates how the
current panel may resolve the present dispute. If EC customs practices
violate WTO law, then remedy under the WTO system must also be
considered. In particular, should the EC fail in its obligations under Article
X:3(b), the question arises whether a remedy pursuant to WTO dispute
settlement procedures empowers a panel or the Appellate Body to
recommend, and the Dispute Settlement Body to require, alteration of
national judicial systems to effectuate compliance with WTO law. A final
consideration, related to remedy, is whether Article XXIV provides a
defense or exception to Article X's requirements thereby insulating the EC
from violation of its WTO obligations.

Establishing the Community Customs Code, 1992 O.J. (L 302) 1 (last altered by Commission
Regulation (EC) 60/2004, Laying down transitional measures in the sugar sector by reason of the
accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland,
Slovenia, and Slovakia, 2004 O.J. (L 009) 8). On evidence of this claim, see TIMOTHY LYONS, EC
CUSTOMS LAW 452-53 (2001) (describing United Kingdom's different system for appeal).
41. Dispute Settlement Body, supra note 25, 29 (Mar. 21, 2005).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44.Id.
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A. Article X 3(a)
1. General Principles
In the context of disputes alleging a violation of Article X, certain
general rules of interpretation are applied.45 The first general interpretative

principle is a Member may challenge only the administration, not the
substance, of another Member's laws, regulations, decisions, and rulings
under Article X:3(a). ' Thus, the central requirement under Article X is
that a Member administer its laws uniformly, reasonably, and impartially
with respect to other Members.' Such a requirement exists to promote
predictability for private importers to assess the level of tariff applicable
to a particular good and identify the compulsory procedures required for

entry of merchandise into a nation's customs territory.48

Impartial administration has been interpreted as the absence of an
unfair advantage to a party subject to the challenged laws.49
Reasonableness is defined through consideration of the actual

administration of the law, "in accordance with reason, not irrational or
absurd, proportionate, having sound judgment, sensible, not asking for too
much, within the limits of reason, not greatly less or more than might be
thought likely or appropriate, articulate."' Uniform administration has
been defined as "uniformity of treatment in respect of persons similarly
situated; it cannot be understood to require identical results where relevant

facts differ."'" Uniformity requires that "customs laws should not vary,

45. See DSU, supra note 5, art. 16.1.
46. Appellate Body Report, EuropeanCommunities-Regimeforthe Importation,Sale and
DistributionofBananas,WT/DS27/AB/R, 200 (Sept. 9, 1997) [hereinafter Report on EC].
47. GAT 1947, supranote 4, art. X:3(a). The terms uniform, impartial, and reasonable are
interpreted according to their ordinary meanings pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU. See Appellate
Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R, 114 (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body Shrimp Report].
48. Appellate Body Shrimp Report, supranote 47.
49. Panel Report, Argentina-MeasuresAffecting The Export ofBovineHides andtheImport
ofFinishedLeather,WT/DS 155/R, 11.100 (Dec. 19,2000) (hereinafter Panel Report, Argentina].
50. Panel Report, DominicanRepublicMeasuresAffecting the ImportationandInternalSale
of Cigarettes, WT/DS302/R, 7.388 (Nov. 26, 2004) [hereinafter Panel Report, Dominican
Republic], ruling not challenged in Appellate Body Report, Dominican Republic-Measures
Affecting the Importationand InternalSale ofCigarettes,WT/DS302/AB/R, 56 (Apr. 25, 2005).
51. Panel Report, UnitedStates-Anti-DumpingMeasures on Stainless Steel Platein Coils
andStainlessSteel Sheet andStripfrom Korea, WT/DS 179/R, 6.51 (Dec. 22,2000) [hereinafter
Panel Report, U.S.-Anti-Dumping] (same reasoning applied to determining reasonableness of
administration).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss2/1
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that every exporter and importer should be able to expect treatment of the
same kind, in the same manner both over time and in different places and
with respect to other persons."52 Therefore, "[u]niform administration
requires that Members ensure that their laws are applied consistently and
predictably and is not limited, for instance, to ensuring equal treatment
with respect to WTO Members. 53
Members may challenge another Member's administration of its trade
regulations under three separate and distinct theories: that the
administration of the law is impartial; unreasonable; or lacking uniform
application. 54 Thus, "a [M]ember may... act in a breach of its obligations
under Article X:3(a) of the GATT, if it administers the provisions in an
unreasonable manner, even if there is no evidence... [the] Member has
also administered the provisions in a non-uniform manner or in a
partialized manner., 55 Therefore, a Member fulfills its WTO obligations
if the challenged measure is administered in a reasonable, impartial, and
uniform manner.56
Members prove violations of Article X:3(a) through evidence
illustrating the "real effect that a measure might have on traders operating
in the commercial world. 57 A violation of Article X:3(a) occurs only if the
measure at issue effects a "significant impact on the overall administration
of that Member's
law and not simply on the outcome of the single case in
58
question.
Review of a challenged provision for consistency with a Member's
domestic law is not appropriate under the DSU. 59 Only after consideration
of WTO agreements specifically relating to the dispute at hand should a
Member resort to Article X:3(a). 60
While WTO law excludes review of substantive provisions of a
Member's trade regulations, determination of whether a challenged
measure is administrative or substantive occurs within dispute settlement

52. Panel Report, Argentina, supra note 49, 11.83.
53. Id. Yet, the Article does not require "all products be treated identically." Id. 11.84.
54. See Panel Report. Dominican Republic, supra note 50, 7.383.
55. Id. 7.383.
56. See Panel Report Argentina, supranote 49, 11.86.
57. Id. 11.70.
58. Panel Report, United States-Sunset Review of Anti-Dumping Duties on Corrosion
Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Productsfrom Japan, WT/DS244/R,
7.310 (Aug. 14, 2003)
[hereinafter Sunset Review ofAnti-Dumping] (citing Panel Report, UnitedStates-Anti-Dumping
Measureson CertainHot-RolledSteel ProductsfromJapan,WT/DS 184/R, 7.268 (Feb. 28,2001)
[hereinafter Panel Report, JapanAnti-Dumping Measures]).
59. Id. 7.267; Panel Report, U.S.-Anti-Dumping, supra note 51, 6.50 n.64.
60. Report on EC, supra note 46, 204.
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proceedings by examination of whether the measure is obligative or rightcreating ("a substantive measure") or merely directs the manner of
applying an obligative measure ("an administrative measure").61 Thus, an
administrative measure sets "forth means for the application and
enforcement of substantive customs rules." ' 2 In other words, an
administrative measure "merely provides for a certain manner of applying
[the relevant] substantive rules" and "require[s] the administering
authority to administer those laws and implementing regulations in
[a] ... particular way." 3
Inability to review the challenged measure under Article X:3(a)
because it is substantive does not preclude challenge of the same measure
under other covered WTO agreements." An example of this principle
occurred in a WTO panel action involving the United States. Japan
challenged the substantive provisions of an American statute and
regulation governing self-initiation of anti-dumping reviews under the
WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement and Article X:3(a).65 The panel upheld
the challenge under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, while denying the
reviewability of the same statute and regulation under Article X:3(a).66
Hence, the Anti-Dumping Agreement permitted substantive challenge of
the measure, which was precluded under Article X:3(a).
A Member may only challenge another Member's "laws, regulations,
judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application" under
Article X:3(a).67 Such "laws, regulations, decisions and rulings" are those
solely defined and enumerated in Article X: 1.6' Should the challenged
measure fail to meet the definition under Article X: 1, then the alleged
violation may not be considered for consistency under Article X:3(a).69
Also precluded from challenge under the Article X:3(a) are specific
actions taken by a Member because such specific measures affecting
61. Panel Report, Argentina, supra note 49, In 11.70, 11.72.
62. Panel Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,
WT/DS217/R, WT/DS234R, IM7.140, 7.144 (Sept. 16, 2002).
63. Id. 7.144 (quoting Panel Report, Argentina, supra note 49, 11.72).
64. Sunset Review ofAnti-Dumping, supra note 58, 7.289; Report on EC, supra note 46,

200.
65. Sunset Review ofAnti-Dumping, supra note 58, IM2.2, 3.1.
66. Id. 7.293.
67. Panel Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Importation of Certain
269-270 (Mar. 13, 1998) [hereinafter Panel Report, European
Poultry Products, WT/DS69/R,
Communities on Poultry].
68. Panel Report, Dominican Republic, supra note 50, 7.375.
69. Id. 7.375 (noting order of analysis and asserting measure must first be within Art. X:1
to then determine measure's consistency with Art. X:3(a)).
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particular transactions fail to meet the general application test.70 Specific
actions are defined as certain demarcated incidences involving application,
to identified goods, of a measure determinative of a particular tariff or
tariff related measure. 7 Therefore, licenses issued to a specific company
or applied to a specific "shipment cannot be considered to be a measure 'of
general application' within the meaning of Article X. ' 72 Although, specific
instances are admissible evidence to show a violation of the Article. 3
There also exists a good faith obligation to fulfill the obligations
articulated in Article X.74 This obligation of good faith has yet to give rise
to the direct applicability in DSU matters of various additional customary
international legal principles, despite strong arguments insisting upon
incorporation of these principles.7 Should these additional customary
principles be inducted into DSU proceedings, a broader interpretation of
the Article would result, implicating greater duties for Members.
2. EC Customs Laws
Although, a WTO panel will not assess the substantive provisions of
EC customs legislation, a general discussion of the relevant portions of the
current EC customs regime provides an appropriate context to discuss
whether its administration violates WTO law.7' Management of customs
70. Appellate BodyReport, EuropeanCommunities-MeasuresAffectingtheImportationof
CertainPoultryProducts,WTDS69/AB/R, 114 (July 13, 1998); Appellate Body Report, United
States-Restrictionson Imports ofCotton andMan-Made Fibre Underwear,WT/DS24/AB/R, at
21 (Feb. 25, 1997).
71. Appellate Body Report, European Communities on Poultry,supranote 70, IM 113-14
(Appellate Body ruling Members need not specify "in advance the precise treatment to be accorded
to each individual shipment").
72. Id. 113 (Appellate Body agreeing with and quoting Panel's Report 269).
73. Panel Report, JapanAnti-Dumping Measures,supranote 58, 7.268.
74. Panel Report, UnitedStates-DefinitiveSafeguardMeasureson Imports ofCertainSteel
Products, WT/DS248/R, WT/DS249/R, WT/DS251IR, WT/DS252/R, WT/DS253/R,
WT/DS254/R, WT/DS258/R, WT/DS259/R, 7.1986 n.4715 (July 11,2003); U.N. Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 26, 31(1), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered intoforceJan. 27,
1980) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
75. See generally JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFICT OF NORMS INPUBuC INTERNATIONAL LAW:
How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003); John 0. McGinnis,
The AppropriateHeirarchyofGlobalMultilateralismand CustomaryInternational:The Example
of the WTO, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 229, 261-69 (2003); Joost Pauwelyn, The Role of Public
InternationalLaw in the WTO: How FarCan We Go?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 535 (2001).
76. See Panel Report, Argentina,supranote 49, 11.61. The Panel asserted "it is incumbent
upon us to ensure that in our analysis we focus on the administration of the Customs laws." Id. For
a historical account of EC customs law, see LYONS, supra note 40, at 1-193; DOMINIK LASOK, THE
TRADE AND CUSTOMS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 26-37, 363-400 (3d ed. 1998); BEN J.M.
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issues at the Community level occurs through cooperation between the
Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry, and Research) component of
the European Council, the Committee on Internal Market and Consumer
Protection of the European Parliament, and the European Commission's
Taxation and Customs Union Directorate-General." These bodies create
and execute a general customs strategy which prioritizes the operational
implementation of EC law, increased competitiveness of the EC in
international trade, and effective utilization of technology in the collection
of customs duties.78
The basis of customs law in the EC is the Uniform Customs Code of
the European Union. 9 The Code provides a uniform set of general rules
to be implemented by national customs authorities to harmonize the
application of duties and procedures for processing imports into the EC. °
The Code compliments the Treaty establishing the European Community
Articles 23 to 27 and title X, which mandates implementation of a
TERRA, COMMUNITY CUSTOMS LAW, A GUIDE TO THE CUSTOMS RULES ON TRADE BETWEEN THE

(ENLARGED) EU AND THIRD COUNTRIES 3-37 (1995) (addressing each aspect of the Code); Izzet
M. Sinan, European Community CustomsDuties:A Significant ConsiderationforUS. Companies,
18 WM. MrrcHELL L. REv. 401 (1992); PATRICK L. KELLY & Ivo ONKELUN, EEC CUSTOMS LAW
(1986) (containing community legislation, judicial decisions, and forms in use at the time).
77. See TREATY ESTABLISHGTHE EUROPEANCOMMUNiTY, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C325) 33,
90-91 (2002) (art. 33); EC Directorate General for Taxation and the Customs Union, Mission
Statement (2006), availableathttpJ/ec.europa.eu/taxationcustoms/resources/documentscommon/
about/welcome/missionstatementen.pdf (last visited June 8, 2006); European Parliament,
Committee Responsibilities (2005), availableat http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/exportI
committees/presenationdo?committee=124121anguageEN (last visited June 8, 2006); European
Council, Press Release 13839/ (02 Presse 344) 5-6 (Nov. 14, 2002).
78. See European Commission, The Communication Concerninga Strategyforthe Customs
Union, 14-16 EUR. PAR.. Doc. (COM 51) 2001, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/
LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com200l_005len0l.pdf (last visited June 22, 2005); Council
Resolution (EC) 171/01, Strategy for the Customs Union, 2001 O.J. (C 171) 1 (affirming customs
strategy). Customs duties are taxes collected and levied by customs authorities. See Council
Regulation (EEC) 2913/92, Establishing the Community Customs Code, Articles 4(10), 20(3)(c-g),
1992 O.J. (L 302) 1 (last amended by the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech
Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic
of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic ofMalta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic
of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European
Union is founded, 2003 O.J. (L 2360) 33) [hereinafter Code].
79. See id. arts. 243, 245; Commission Regulation (EEC) 2454/93, laying down provisions
for the implementation ofCouncil Regulation (EEC) 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs
Code, 1993 OJ. (L 253) 1 (last amended by Council Regulation (EC) No. 837/2005 of May 23,
2005 amending Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2454/93 laying down provisions for the
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs
Code 2004 O.J. (L 139) 1-2) [hereinafter Implementing Regulation].
80. See Code, supra note 78, arts. 1, 2(1), 4(10), 20.
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common external tariff scheme applicable to all third country imports by
the Member States, as well as requires cooperation between national
customs authorities in relation to customs matters. 8 ' Although the Code is
the central component of EC customs regulation, other laws affect EC
customs procedures across all Member States. 2 National customs
authorities apply the Code and Community legislation to "collect duties
which have to be passed on to the EC as the Community's own resources
(subject to a deduction of 10% to defray administrative expenses).""
The common external tariff "applies to all products imported into the
Community from outside the EC, thus erecting a single tariff wall which
no individual state is free to breach." Although not included in the Code,
the common external tariff is incorporated by reference in Article 20(1) of
the Code, which mandates the exclusive application of the integrated tariff
of the EC to ensure all imports subject to a duty are collected uniformly.8 5
The common external tariff is synonymous with the integrated EC
tariff, commonly know by the acronym TARIC."6 The TARIC is
comprised of the tariff classification system embodied in the International
Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
System (Harmonized System) and the Common Customs Tariff." The
Harmonized System

81. See generallyEuropean Commission, The Customs Policy ofthe European Union (1999),
availableathttp://europa.eu.int/comm/publications/booldets/moveI 9/txtqen.htm (last visited June
22,2005).
82. On major customs laws surveyed, see generally STEFANO INAMA & EDwIN VERMULST,
CUSTOMS AND TRADE LAWS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNrY 136-92 (1999); see also Directory of
Community Legislation 02, available at http://europa.eu.intleur-lex/lex/en/repert/index_02. htm
(last visited June 22, 2005) (containing all legislation in effect currently relating to customs in the
EC).
83. K.P.E. LASOK & D. LASOK, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 434 (7th
ed. 200 1). EC Member States may not enact separate legislation governing classification of goods
for tariff purposes. Id. at 435 (citing HZA Bremen-Feihafen v. Waren-Import Gesellschaft Krohn
& Co., 1970 E.C.R. 451, at 463; Deutsche Bakels GmbH v. Oberfinazdirektion M~chen, 1970
E.C.R. 1001; Gijs van de Kolk v. Inspector der Invoerrechten, 1990 E.C.R. 1-265).
84. JOSEPHINE STEINER & LORNA WOODS, TEXTBOOK ON EC LAW 139 (7th ed. 2000).
85. MICHAEL Lux, GUIDE TO COMMUNrrY CUSTOMS LEGISLATION 76 (2002).
86. TARIC stands for "Tarif intdgrd des Communautds europdennes." Id.at 77. See TOM
WALSH, THE CUSTOMS CODE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION WITH IMPLEMENTING REGULATION AND

ANNEXES 47 (Damian McCarthy ed., 2000).

87. International Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
System, June 14, 1983, 1035 U.N.T.S. 3. (enteredintoforce Jan. 1, 1988). See Council Regulation
(EEC) 2658/87, Tariff and Statistical Nomenclature and Common Customs Tariff, 1987 O.J. (L
256) 1 (last amended by Council Regulation (EC) 493/2005, Amending Annex I to Regulation
(EEC) 2658/87, Tariff and Statistical Nomenclature and Common Customs Tariff, 2005 O.J. (L
082) 1); LYONS, supra note 40, at 111.
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is a multipurpose international product nomenclature developed by
the World Customs Organization (WCO). It comprises about 5,000
commodity groups, each identified by a 6-digit code, arranged in a
legal and logical structure and is supported by well-defined rules to
achieve uniform classification. The system is used by more than
190 countries and economies as a basis for their customs tariffs and
for the collection of international trade statistics.88
A technical committee of the WCO, the Harmonized System Committee,
manages the Harmonized System nomenclature (description of goods
under headings and subheadings) and provides appropriate amendments
to the classification of goods under particular sections of the System. 9
Additionally, the Committee issues opinions regarding classification of
specific goods, as well as modifies the explanatory notes (or interpretive
guidance utilized in classifying a good) under each heading." The
Committee is supported by the Scientific Sub-Committee and the
Harmonized System Review Committee in ensuring that classification
descriptions are technically current and in accord with trading practices. 9'
The method of classification is governed by the General Rules of
Interpretation, which provide a delineated method to determine the proper
tariff classification of a good.92 The Harmonized System provides the basis
for the EC integrated tariff, and is enacted into Community law. 93
The Common Customs Tariff (CCT) provides the rate of duty in all
instances save imposition of a flat-rate charge or application of duty
relief." The CCT is defined in Article 20(3) of the Customs Code, and
consists of seven distinct elements. These are: 1. the Combined
Nomenclature (CN); 2. other applicable nomenclature; 3. rates normally
levied on CN goods under the Common Agricultural Policy or other

88. Panel Report, European Communities-Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless
Chicken Cuts, WT/DS269/R, 2.9 (May 30, 2005) [hereinafter Panel Report, EC-FrozenChicken].
See generally FRANCIS SNYDER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CUSTOMS LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION

6-10 (1998).

89. Classification of goods or tariff classification "governs the application of customs duties
and also the application of other trade-related measures including quantative restrictions, antidumping duties, preferential tariffrates, export refunds and suspension ofcustoms duties." SNYDER,
supranote 88, at 6.
90. Id.
91. See id. n.5.
92. See Integrated Tariffofthe European Communities, 2003 O.J. (C 103) 1,10-11 (rules 1-6
are the WCO general rules for the interpretation of the Harmonized System).
93. 1987 O.J. (L 198) 3.
94. Lux, supra note 85, at 108 (citing Code, supra note 78, art. 20(1), (4)).
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specific regulation governing the processing of agricultural goods; 4.

preferential tariff provisions between the EC and third countries; 5.
preferential tariff measures based solely on EC regulations; 6.
"autonomous suspensive measures providing for a reduction in, or relief
from, import duties;" and 7. any other tariff measures provided for in EC
law.95 The CN is a list of descriptive product classifications consisting of
"four columns showing the CN code numbers, the description of goods
and two rates of duties." The two rates of duty reflect autonomous duties,
"which are the original CCT rates[,] and 'conventional' duties" that apply
to WTO Members as well as other states granted Most Favored Nation
status by the EC. 97
Therefore, the TARIC

comprises: (a) the HS nomenclature; (b) EC subdivisions to that
nomenclature, referred to as "CN subheadings"; and (c) preliminary
provisions, additional section or chapter notes and footnotes
relating to CN subheadings. Therefore, each subheading in the CN
has an eight-digit code number with the first six digits representing
the corresponding digits in the HS and the last two digits
identifying CN subheadings. Additionally, a ninth digit is reserved
for the use of national statistical subdivisions and a tenth and
eleventh digit for an EC integrated tariff[.] ... The CN consists of
21 sections, covering 99 chapters. The CN is contained in Annex I
of EEC Regulation No. 2658/87.9
Every good entering the customs territory of the EC, as defined in
Article 3 of the Customs Code, must be classified under the TARIC. 99
Classification occurs through physical examination of a good and its
constituent elements to determine that good's placement under a heading
and subheading to assess the corresponding rate of duty set down in the
TARIC.' ° It is the responsibility of the importer to properly classify the
merchandise entering the customs territory of the EC; such classification

95. LYONs, supranote 40, at 112-13.
96. LASOK & LASOK, supranote 83, at 434.
97. Id.
98. Panel Report, EC-Frozen Chicken, supra note 88, 2.5. See also WALSH, supra note 86,
at 47.
99. See Code, supra note 78, art. 20(6). See generally LYONS, supra note 40, at 111-57
(discussing operation of the tariff system); WALSH, supra note 86, at 51-80 (describing
classification system and relevant legal authorities). There are limited exceptions for dual-use
items, endangered species, dangerous chemicals, and waste. See Lux, supra note 85, at 79.
100. See Code, supra note 78, art. 20(6); see generally Lux, supra note 85, at 78-108.
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is subject to review by national customs authorities at the point of entry of
the goods.' Classification of the goods under a heading and subheading
determines the amount of duty owed at the point of entry.0 2 National
customs 10 authorities
are charged with the uniform application of the
3
TARIC.

Article 12 of the Customs Code provides for the issuance of Binding
Tariff Information (BTI) on tariff classification of goods, which is an
opinion by the national customs authorities on the proper TARIC
classification of a particular good.' °4 These BTIs are binding on all
Member States as to the TARIC classification of the good, and the
importer may request BTIs by writing to a Member State or States'
national customs authorities. 10 5 The BTI is binding for a period of six
years, unless a Community Regulation is adopted announcing: a
contradictory legal basis from that of the BTI; the interpretation of the BTI
is no longer valid because of a change in the governing nomenclature; or
the holder of the BTI is notified of withdrawal, amendment, or revocation
of the BTI. 6 Copies of all BTIs issued or revoked by national customs
authorities must be transmitted to the European Commission by electronic
means. 107
Unfortunately, separate Member State customs authorities have issued
contradictory classifications for the same goods.'0 8 However, the
101. WALSH, supranote 86, at 52. Howe & Bainbridge BV v. Oberfinanzdirektion Frankfurt
am Main, 1982 E.C.R. 3257. The Court of Justice holds "it is for the Member States to designate
the authorities and the persons called upon to undertake the tariff classification of products and to
determine the training of such persons in order to enable them to perform their task properly." Id.
102. Code, supra note 78, art. 20(2), (6).
103. WALSH, supra note 86, at 51-52. Sociaal Fonds voor de Diamantarbeiders v. NV
Indiamex et Association de fait De Belder, 1973 E.C.R. 1609. The Court of Justice rules "Member
States may not, subsequent to the establishment of the common customs tariff, introduce, in a
unilateral manner, new charges on goods imported directly from third countries or raise the level
of those in existence at that time." Id.
104. Code, supra note 78, art. 12(2). See also id. art. 11(1) (any person may request
information from customs authorities on legislation). Cf id. arts. 8, 9 (relating to national customs
authorities' decisions issuance and withdrawal).
105. Id. art. 12(1); Implementing Regulation, supra note 79, art. 6(1), 11. The importer may
supply models for examination and testing. See generally WALSH, supra note 86, at 40-42.
106. Code, supra note 78, art. 12(4),(5). See Wesergold GmbH & Co. KG v.
Oberfinanzdirektion Munchen, 1991 E.C.R. 1-1895.
107. Implementing Regulation, supra note 79, arts. 8(1), 13.
108. See, e.g., Commission Decision (EC) 97/2003, Validity of Certain Binding Tariff
Information (BTI) issued by the Federal Republic of Germany, 2003 O.J. (L 36) 40 (redressing
German customs authority's divergent BTIs on classification from EC regulation); RALPH H.
FOLSOM & MICHAEL P. CLOES, EUROPEAN UNION BusINEss LAW A GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE
HANDBOOK 272 (1995) (noting Member State BTIs fail to disregard traditional national views); see

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol18/iss2/1

18

Erskine: The U.S.-EC Dispute over Custom Matters: Trade Facilitation, Cust

THE US.-EC DISPUTE OVER CUSTOMMATERS

Implementing Regulation lays out a procedure for remedying
inconsistencies in BTIs.' °9 The Commission, upon the discovery of
different BTIs relating to the same goods producing inconsistent TARIC
classification, shall adopt a measure to effect uniform tariff
classification. "0
Entry of goods into any EC Member State must be accompanied by the
Single Administrative Document for the purpose of making a formal
customs declaration to the Member State's customs authority to access the
appropriate duty.' The utilization of electronic measures for importers to
make declarations is under review by the EC."2 The Commission
introduced a revised, modernized customs code to harmonize the use of
information technology in customs matters between the Member States,
and the Council recently enacted the Commission's recommendations." 3
The new system for computerized declarations will take effect on July 1,
2006, but permits exceptions for Member States not possessing the
necessary computer technology for a transition period." 4
The Customs Code establishes a Customs Code Committee for the
purpose of answering questions raised by its chairman or any Member of

also U.S. Trade Representative, 2005 Trade Policy Agenda and 2004 Annual Report of the
President of the United States on the Trade Agreements Program 175-76 (2005) (noting
discrepancy in classifications), available at http://www.ustr.gov/DocumentLibrary/Reports_
Publications/2005/2005_TradePolicyAgenda/Section Index.html(last visited June 22, 2005);
Decision No. 253/2003/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Adopting an Action
Programme for Customs in the Community (Customs 2007), 2003 O.J. (L 36) 1 (authorizing
pragmatic reform for new EC Member States through adoption of Commission recommendation
appearing at 2002 O.J. (C 126 E) 268); Decision No. 210/97/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council, Adopting an Action Programme for Customs in the Community (Customs 2000),
1997 O.J. (L 33) 24, amended by Decision 105/2000/EC, 2000 OJ. (L 13) 1 (discussing similar
issues in context of previous program).
109. Implementing Regulation, supranote 79, art. 9.
110. Id.
111. Id. arts. 205, 222 (defining paper and electronic processing of formal declarations).
112. See European Commission, Communication on a Simple and Paperless Environment for
Customs and Trade and on the Role of Customs in the Integrated Management of External Borders
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Council
Regulation (EEC) 2913/92, Establishing the Community Customs Code, COM (2003) 452 final
(July 24, 2003); Council Resolution, Creating a Simple and Paperless Environment for Customs
and Trade, 2003 O.J. (C 305) 1, adopted July 24, 2003 by the Council, 2004 O.J. (C 96) 10.
113. Council Regulation (EC) 837/2005, amendingCommission Regulation (EEC) 2454/93,
laying down provisions for the implementation ofCouncil Regulation (EEC) 2913/92, Establishing
the Community Customs Code, 2005 O.J. (L 139) 1.
114. See id.
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the EC on the subject of Community customs legislation." 5 The
Committee takes responsibility for maintenance of the CN and
recommends classification regulations to harmonize tariff classifications
across the EC."6 The Committee is comprised of representatives of all
Member States and is led by a chairman empowered to raise questions on
Community customs legislation for the Committee's consideration and
resolution."7
The Commission, under the Customs 2007 program, takes a leading
role in the promulgation of new legislation and initiatives to reform
customs administration throughout the EC and harmonize Member States'
administration of community customs legislation through
computerization." 8 The Custom 2007 program follows previous agendas
in retaining a Customs Policy Committee to discuss broad ranging issues

affecting customs administration." 9 The purpose of the Committee is to
make recommendations to the Commission for necessary changes in the
administration of Community customs legislation throughout the EC, as
well as manage the Customs 2007 program initiatives. 2 '
The EC, as a member of the WTO, is bound by a number of
international conventions that establish general standards applicable to the
municipal administration of customs matters to ensure a degree of
uniformity in the realm of international trade.' 2' Expanding the scope of
traditional GATT obligations, WTO agreements extended Member-

115. Code, supranote 78, arts. 247(1), 248(1) (examining Combined Nomenclature, TARIC
nomenclature, and any other nomenclature based on the Combined Nomenclature).
116. See, e.g., Hewlett Packard BV v. Directeur gdnrai des douanes et droits indirects, 2001
E.C.R. 1-03981, 18 (describing Customs Committee as serving articulated function and detailing
process of BTI challenge from national authorities to European Court of Justice).
117. Code, supranote 78, art. 247(1).
118. See supra note 112.
119. See Reportfrom the Commission to the European Parliamentand the Council on the
Implementation of the Customs 2002 Programme,EUR. PARL. DoC. (COM 672) 2003, at 10, 12
(reciting goal of expanded use of technology and asserting electronic TARIC greatest source for
unifying Member State customs administration of EC law); see also Decision 253/2003/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council, Adopting an Action Programme for Customs in the
Community (Customs 2007), 2003 O.J. (L 36) 1 (authorizing pragmatic reform for new EC
Member States through adoption of Commission recommendation appearing at 2002 O.J. (C 126
E) 268); Decision 210/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, Adopting an Action
Programme for Customs in the Community (Customs 2000), 1997 O.J. (L 33) 24, amended by
Decision 105/2000/EC (Customs 2002), 2000 O.J. (L 13) 1(discussing similar issues in context of
previous program).
120. See supra note 119.
121. Seegenerally Kevin C. Kennedy, The GA TT-WTO System atFifty,16 WIS. INT'LL.J. 421
(1998) (discussing history of GATT and WTO innovations).
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nations' obligations over certain aspects of customs administration. "
These agreements, concluded at the Uruguay Round, include the
Agreements on Technical Barriers to Trade, Preshipment Inspection,
Import Licensing, Anti-Dumping, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,
Trade-Related Investment Measures, and Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures.' 23 The WCO administers the WTO Agreement on Customs
Valuation and Rules of Origin, and therefore works closely with the WTO
in the areas of customs administration.' 24
3. Discussion of Relevant WTO Disputes
Having presented a broad overview of EC customs law, analysis of
previous WTO decisions follows. These decisions reflect possible
interpretations panels or the WTO Appellate Body may adopt in
formulating a remedy to a situation similar to the present dispute. With a
proper context of the substance of EC customs legislation, its application
as alleged in the present dispute may be shown to be inconsistent with
Article X:3(a) through WTO decisions.

122. Cf Case 1/94, Competence of the Community to Conclude International Agreements
Concerning Services and the Protection of Intemational Property, 1994 E.C.R. 1-5267 (concluding
the Community did not have competence to conclude WTO agreements on trade in services and
intellectual property); see generally Nanette Neuwahl, The WTO Opinion andImplied External
Powers of the Community--A Hidden Agenda?, in THE GENERAL LAW OF E.C. EXTERNAL
RELATIONS 139-51 (Alan Dashwood & Christophe Hillion eds., 2000).
123. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 117 (1994);
Agreement on Preshipment Inspections, Apr. 15, 1994, availableat http://www.wto.org/englisbdocs e/legal e/21-psi.pdf(last visited June 23, 2005); Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures,
Apr. 15,1994, availableathttp://www.wto.orgfenglish/docs.e/legale/23-lic.pdf(last visited June
23, 2005); Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI, Apr. 15, 1994, Anti-Dumping
Agreement, availableat http://www.wto.orglenglish/docs_e/legal e/19-adp.pdf)(last visited June
23, 2005); Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,
1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (1994); Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15,1994,1868
U.N.T.S. 186 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/i 8-trims.pdf (last
visited June 23,2005); Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994,1867
U.N.T.S. 14 (1994), available at http://www.wto.orgenglish/docs_e/legal e/24-scm.pdf (last
visited June 23, 2005).
124. See Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 168,171 (1994). Customs valuation relates to the method
of calculating the value of goods entered into a country's customs territory for the purpose of
levying the appropriate rate of duty. Id. art. 1. The chief method of determining the value of goods
entering a territory is transaction value or "the price actually paid or payable for the goods when
sold for export to the country of importation." Id. See Agreement on Rules of Origin, Apr. 15, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 209 (1994). Rules of origin are "laws, regulations and administrative determinations of
general application applied by any Member to determine the country of origin of goods," as well
as apply preferential tariff duty rates. Id. art. 1.
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a. Honduras v. Dominican Republic
Honduras challenged the Dominican Republic's rules and
administrative practices governing the imposition of a tax upon
cigarettes. 2 Three separate laws requiring three separate standards
governed the manner in which the Dominican customs authority assessed
the appropriate tax upon imported cigarettes.'26 The three separate
standards obligated Dominican customs officials to apply three unique
formulas, each resulting in a different amount of tax assessed upon
imported cigarettes depending upon which formula the customs authority
employed.' 27 Despite the laws, evidence before the panel proved that the
customs authority administered a fourth, extra-legal methodology, to
determine the appropriate tax in practice.12 8 Although the Dominican
Republic had replaced the three separate laws and fourth extra-legal
methodology at the time of the panel report, the panel decided that use of
the fourth extra-legal methodology, at the time the dispute arose, to
determine the appropriate tax base for imported cigarettes with no notice
to importers of this practice was an129unreasonable administration of the
law, which violated Article X:3(a).
The result of the dispute emphasizes the requirement of uniformity in
the application of a WTO Member's trade regulations, as well as the
necessity for harmonization of internal municipal law to ensure
notification of the regulations to importers by consistent operation of the
laws. 30 In addition, the dispute expounds a general rule requiring that a
WTO Member not enforce separate and distinct laws or regimes, which
lead to contradictory results in tariff classification.' 3 ' The panel announced
another wide-ranging tenet of WTO law: that application of extra-legal
measures
132 to determine tariff classification is a violation of Article

X:3(a).

Applying the above standards to the U.S.-EC dispute, the EC as a
whole legislates a uniform customs tariff classification scheme, the

125. Panel Report, Dominican Republic, supra note 50, IM1.3, 2.5.

126. Id. 7.380.
127. Id.

128. Id. 7.387.
129. Id. IN 7.388, 7.390, 7.392.
130. Panel Report, Dominican Republic, supra note 50, M 7.390-7.393 (noting adoption of
single tax code provision repealing previous laws and instituting single tax).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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TARIC. 33 The national customs authorities administer the TARIC in
different ways leading to contradictory tariff classifications.'34 These
classifications amount to an extra-legal determination of the appropriate
tariff classification. Consistent operation of the TARIC should provide
uniform tariff classification throughout the EC. The EC presents one legal
regime to importers, but additional legal rules exist, unbeknownst to the
importer, by which national customs authorities classify goods outside of
governing Community law.'35 Therefore, national customs authorities
operate separate classification regimes applying multiple standards to
disparately classify the same goods under the TARIC. The actions of
national customs authorities constitute an unreasonable administration of
the EC customs regime because the customs authorities operate extra-legal
tariff classification regulations, which cause classification of the same
goods under different TARIC rates of duty. Furthermore, such an
administration of the EC customs laws by national customs authorities is
unreasonable because the various national authorities apply different rates
of duties dependant36upon which national customs authority initially
classifies the goods.
For similar reasons, tariff classification of the same goods between
different EC Member States illustrates partiality.'37 Importers entering
their goods in one Member State receive a classification at a lower rate of
duty, while other importers entering the same goods in another Member
State incur a greater rate of duty. 3 Both Member States should apply the
same rate of duty under the same classification for the same goods.
Assurance of the similarly of classification between Member States
ensures importers receive impartial treatment under the EC customs
regime.
b. EC BananasIII
Another relevant dispute arose as to "whether the requirements of
uniformity, impartiality and reasonableness set out in Article X:3(a)

133. See supranotes 86, 87, 93.
134. See supranote 108.
135. See supra note 108.
136. See supra note 108.
137. Although, a Head of Division in the European Commission argues, in relation to
providing uniform tariff classifications, "[g]iven the large variety of goods traded worldwide and
the overlapping principles of the tariff nomenclature, different classification results cannot be
excluded even if the utmost attention is paid in the classification process." Lux, supra note 85, at
103.
138. See supranote 108 (collecting sources noting phenomenon).
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preclude[d] the imposition of different import licensing systems on like
products imported from different Members.' 39 The EC operated two
separate import regimes: "one preferential regime for traditional ACP
4
bananas and one erga omnes regime for all other imported bananas."' 0
Application of the separate schemes involved distinct licensure
requirements depending upon the origin of the bananas for the purpose of
ensuring bananas from ACP nations were more competitive in the EC
market with the assistance of the import licensing scheme and combined
tariff preferences. 4' The licensing scheme imposed a greater burden on
third party banana importers to provide large amounts of information to
obtain the license, while permitting traditional ACP bananas licensure
142
based on substantially less submitted data.
A 1968 note by the GATT Director-General, interpreted Article
X:3(a)'s requirement ofuniform, impartial, and reasonable administration
of customs laws to prohibit a contracting party from implementing
different regulations and procedures.'43 The note asserted GATT
obligations "would not permit, in the treatment accorded to imported
goods, discrimination based on country of origin, nor would they permit
the application of one set of regulations and procedures with respect to
some contracting parties and a different set with respect to the others."'"
The WTO Appellate Body confirmed that the note was never adopted by
the GATT contracting parties. 145 As a result, the Appellate Body "found
that the panel erred in finding that Article X:3(a) of the GATT 1994
precludes the imposition of one system of import licensing procedures on
a product originating in certain Members and a different system on the
same product originating in other Members."'" Therefore, WTO Members
may apply different import licensing requirements depending upon the
country in which a product originates in accord with Article X:3(a).

139. Report on EC, supra note 46, 199.
140. Id. 23. ACP "refers to African, Caribbean and Pacific States which are parties to the
Fourth ACP-EC Convention of Lomd (Lomd Convention), signed in Lomd, 15 December 1989, as
revised by the Agreement signed in Mauritius, 4 November 1995." Id. n.2.
141. Id. 29.
142. Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for Importation, Sale and Distribution
of Bananas, WT/DS27/R/GTM,WT/DS27/R/HND,
7.211 (May 22, 1997) [hereinafter Panel
Report, EC-Bananas].
143. GATT Director-General, Agreement on Implementation of Article V1,Nov. 29, 1968,
L/3149; see GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO GATT
LAW AND PRACTICE 274 (6th ed. 1994).
144. Panel Report, EC-Bananas, supra note 142, 7.209.
145. Report on EC, supra note 46, 200.
146. Id. 201.
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The dispute illustrates that WTO Members possess flexibility in the
practical application of customs laws, upon the express provision that
different licensing schemes are identified and accessible to a third
country's traders. The EC may employ different licensing schemes on
specific products originating in specific countries, but may not ad hoc
permit Member States to enforce different licensing schemes
individually.'47 It is consistent with Article X:3(a) for an importer's
merchandise to receive different treatment dependent upon its point of
entry into the EC under a licensing scheme previously notified to the
importer.'48 Under the licensing regulations analyzed in the dispute,
individual national customs authorities did not practically employ different
import licensing requirements; rather, the licensing measures applied
across the EC and were uniformly enforced by the national customs
authorities. "4
The U.S.-EC dispute is distinguishable from the WTO's previous
allowance of separate licensing schemes by the EC. The distinction occurs
because the separate licensing regimes in EC Bananas 111, described
above, were imposed uniformly by the EC national customs authorities
pursuant to Community law (i.e., the national authorities did not impose
separate alternate national import licensing requirements). In the present
dispute, the EC operates a uniform classification system at the Community
level, while on the national level, Member States classify the same goods
differently, yielding disparate rates of duty. This system lacks uniform
application of the Community legislation at the national level, and is not
similar to the WTO-compliant import licensing regime described in EC
Bananas 111. The system presently the subject of dispute between the
United States and the EC violates Article X:3(a) because it lacks uniform
administration.
B. Article X.3(b)
A WTO Member must guarantee judicial or administrative procedures
exist to ensure prompt review of administrative decisions relating to
customs matters within the Member's territory. 5 These tribunals or
procedures must exist independent of the customs agency responsible for
enforcement of their decisions. 5 ' Decisions by independent procedure or
tribunal govern the customs authority's administration of the law, unless
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

See Report on EC, supranote 46.
Id.
Id.
See GATr 1947, supra note 4, art. X:3(b).
Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2006

25

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 1

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 18

a Member's municipal laws permit appeal of such decisions to another
body. 2 Should a Member permit an additional appeal under domestic law,
the customs authority must be authorized to challenge the subsequent
appellate decision "in another proceeding if there is good cause to believe
that the decision is inconsistent with established principles of law or the
actual facts."' 53
1. General Principles
Detailed discussion of Article X:3(b) in either WTO or GATT disputes
has not occurred. Of the disputes mentioning the section, a general rule
requiring "Members to maintain appropriate judicial, arbitral or
administrative tribunals or procedures" to address customs matters is
articulated." The general rule exists to "provide for domestic review
procedures relating to customs matters to which normally only private
traders, not Members would have access."' 55 A Member must, under
Article X, ensure "rigorous compliance with the fundamental requirements
of due process.., in the application and administration of a measure[,]
which purports to be an exception to the treaty obligations ... ," and
guarantee due process is observed by measures executing ordinary WTO
obligations. 5 ' Additionally, Article X "establisheshacertain minimum
standards for transparency
.... ,,r and procedural fairness in the administration of
regulations
trade
2. EC Customs Law
Any ruling by a Member States' customs authorities may be challenged
by an importer.' 58 The importer, following applicable national laws,
protests the customs decision to the customs authority itself.5 9 Practically,
an importer "directly and individually concerned by a decision of the
customs authorities on the application of the customs legislation" lodges
an appeal before the national customs authority, "unless national law
determines that the person concerned may appeal directly to the judicial

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Id.
Panel Report, US.-Anti-Dumping, supranote 51, n.64.
Panel Report, Argentina, supranote 49, 11.68. See GAT 1994, supranote 4.
Appellate Body Shrimp Report, supra note 47, 182.
Id. 183.
Code, supra note 78, art. 243(1) (right of appeal exercised in Member State where

decision taken or applied for).
159. Id art. 243(2Xa).
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authority."'" To protest the customs authority failing to provide the
remedy desired by the importer, an appeal may be lodged pursuant to
national laws in an independent, usually judicial, tribunal.'6 I Appellate
procedures are set out in the separate Member States' laws, and there is no
mandate that these procedures be uniform throughout the EC. 62 There are
requirements that national procedures not "be framed in such a way as to
render virtually impossible or very difficult the exercise of the rights
conferred by EC law," and that Community law "be treated [no] less
favourably than comparable national claims."' 63 The European Court of
Justice succinctly held that Member States of the EC must "designate the
courts having jurisdiction and... determine the procedural conditions
governing actions at law intended to ensure the protection of the rights
which citizens have from direct effect of Community law."'" Additionally,
the Court of Justice articulated EC treaty instruments permit
appropriate measures to remedy differences between provisions laid
down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States
if they are likely to distort or harm the functioning of the common
market... [, but in] the absence of such harmonization[,] the right
conferred by Community law must be exercised before the national
courts in accordance with the conditions laid down by national
rules.' 65

160. Lux, supra note 85, at 62-63 (citing Kofisa Italia Srl. Minestero delle Finaze, 2001
E.C.R. 1-207).
161. Code, supra note 78, art. 243(2)(bXtribunal may be judicial or equivalent specialized
body established under Member States laws). See also id. art. 244 (lodging of appeal does not
suspend decision, but mandatory suspension upon customs authorities belief decision contrary to
EC customs legislation).
162. Id. art. 245. See SIONAIDH DOUGLAS-SCOTT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN

UNION 312 (Pearson Education 2002) (asserting community relegates enforcement to national
Member States without procedural mandates to guide implementation).
163. DOUGLA-ScoTT, supranote 162, at 313; see generally KOEN LENAERT & DIRK ARTS,
PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (Robert Bray ed., 1999).
164. LENAERTS & ARTS, supranote 163, at 57 n.2, 59 nn.9-10 (quoting Case 33/76, Rewe v.
Landwirtschaftskammer Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 1989; Case 811/79, Case 826/79, Amministrazione
delle Stato v. Ariete, 1980 E.C.R. 2545, 2554-55; Amministrazione deile Finanze dello Stato v.
MIRECO, 1980 E.C.R. 2559,2574-75); see Francis G. Jacobs,EnforcingCommunity Rights and
Obligations in National Courts: Striking the Balance, in REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF EC LAw, 25,
28-32 (Julian Lonbay & Andrea Biondi eds., 1997) (describing procedural and judicial procedures
required by EC law); Grainne De Burca, National ProceduralRules and Remedies: Changing
Approach ofthe CourtofJustice,in REMEDIES FOR BREACH OF EC LAW supra,at 37-46 (discussing
tension between EC mandates and national procedures).
165. LENAERTS & ARTS, supra note 163, at 57 n.2, 59 nn.9-10 (quoting Rewe, 1976 E.C.R.
1989; Case 45/76, Comet v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen, 1976 E.C.R. 2043, 2053).
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The European Court of Justice, in an unreported decision, addressed
whether an individual importer may directly appeal a decision of a national
customs authority to ajudicial tribunal.' Specifically, the Court evaluated
whether "the appeal referred to in Article 243(2) of Regulation (EEC) No.
2913/92 [may] be brought directly before the judicial authority without the
matter having first been referred to the customs authorities."'6 7 The Court
asserted the text of Article 243(2) did not necessitate appeal to the customs
authority followed by subsequent appeal to a judicial tribunal.'18
Further, the Court noted the legislative history of the Article indicated
a rejection of initial proposals requiring detailed appellate procedures,
which "expressly provided that in principle an appeal to the judicial
authorities was to be subject to a prior appeal to the customs
authorities."' 69 Thus, an importer could, in compliance with Community
law, lodge an appeal of a customs decision directly with a judicial body
under a national procedure." ° Yet, Community law does not permit an
importer to bypass provisions of national law requiring first appeal to the
customs authority in favor of lodging a judicial appeal.' Thus, national
law determines whether an importer may appeal a customs decision
directly 7to2 a judicial tribunal or to a customs authority in the first
instance.a
The Court also referred to the opinion issued by the Economic and
Social Committee on the establishment of the Community Customs
Code. '7 The opinion asserted
What makes harmonization [sic] of rights of appeal special however
is not only the differences between national procedures, which are
in some cases considerable, but also the fact that they often apply

166. Case 1/99, Kofisa Italia Sri v. Ministero delle Finanze, J15 (Unreported, Jan. 11, 2001),
availableathttp://curia.eu.int/jurisp/cgi-bin/form.pl?langen&Submit-Subnit& alldocs=alldocs&
docj=docj&docop=docop& docor--docor&docjo=docjo&numaff--&datefi--&datefe=&nomusuel - -&
domaine=&mots--Kofisa+talia+Srl+Ministero+delle+Finanze+&resmax= 100 (last visited July 12,
2005) [hereinafter Case 1/99, Kofisa Italia Sri]. See also Case Comment, Court Rules on Appeals
Procedures vol. 70, 7 (2001).
167. Case 1/99, Kofisa Italia Sri, supra note 166, 17.
168. Id. 36.
169. Id. 40.

170. Id. 39.
171. Id. 42.
172. Case 1/99, Kofisa Italia Sri, supra note 166, 17.
173. Id. 41; Opinion on the proposal for a Council Regulation (EEC) Establishing a
Community Customs Code and the Proposal for a Council Resolution (EEC) determining cases and
the special conditions under which the temporary importation arrangements may be used with total
relief from import duties, 1991 O.J. (C 60) 5 [hereinafter Opinion on EEC].
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uniformly to the whole field of national administrative and tax law
so that the harmonization [sic] of rights of appeal for the purposes
of customs law only will fragment hitherto uniform national appeals
procedures. 74

Additionally, the opinion affirmed the validity of national regulation of
appellate rights relating to customs matters.' The danger, according to the
Committee, was in fragmenting uniform national appellate procedures,
while harmonizing all national law through Community legislation
rules applicable to all customs litigation within the
establishing uniform
176
Community.
In sum, national procedural law determines the method of appeal.
Community law establishes basic norms for appellate procedure, but the
Member States are free to construct the exact method of appeal binding
upon the importer. Yet, the Court did not address whether an importer has
a right to appeal a decision of a national customs authority directly to a
Community body. The right appears implicit because the importer may
request a preliminary ruling from the European Court of Justice on a
customs matter. "' Additionally, an importer may appeal to the Court of
First Instance when: the Commission requests a Member State alter a BTI
issued to a specific importer; upon an error by the customs authority in
levying the appropriate duty on particular merchandise; special
circumstances requiring the repayment or remission of customs duties; or
repayment of duties levied in an anti-dumping or countervailing duties
action where discovery that the "margin of dumping or subsidies is lower
'
than the duty actually paid."178
174. Id. 41. See Opinion on EEC, supra note 173, at 11 (explicating appellate procedures
were not previously harmonized as most other areas embodied in the Customs Code).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 6.
177. Lux, supra note 85, at 63 (right to request preliminary ruling in Article 234 of the EC
Treaty). Cf.Ilona Cheyne, International Instruments as a Source of Community Law, in THE

GENERAL LAw OF E.C. EXTERNAL RELATIONS 254-75 (Alan Dashwood &Christophe Hillion eds.,
2000).
178. Lux, supra note 85, at 63-64. The European Court of Justice consists oftwo independent
courts: The Court of First Instance and the Court of Justice. See KOEN LENAERTS & PIET VAN
NUFFEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 442, 448-50 (Robert Bray ed., 2d ed.
2005) (addressing thejurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and the treaty provisions describing
its role); NEvILLE MARCH HUNNINGS, THE EUROPEAN COURTS 184-229 (1996); see generally
RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (2000). An importer may not challenge a
regulation itself, unless the regulation grants the importer the right of challenge or "where the
person is in a specific situation that differs from that of his competitors." Lux, supra note 85, at 64
(citing Extramet v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2501 and Al Jubail Fertilizer v. Council, 1991 E.C.R.
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3. Violation of EC Customs Code as a Basis for WTO Violation?
The United States alleges EC Member States violate WTO law by
failing to enact domestic appellate remedies as mandated by the Customs
Code 243. "9Additionally, the United States asserts the EC violates Article
X:3(b) because no effective community-wide appellate mechanism exists
to timely address importers disputes with national customs authorities."0
These claims raise three distinct issues. The first, whether violation of the
EC Community law amounts to a violation of WTO obligations. The
second, what is the status of the EC and its Member States within the
WTO treaty regime, particularly whether the United States may directly
challenge EC Member States separately from the EC. The third, whether
the WTO may mandate the EC's alteration of community-wide judicial
proceedings, as well as repeal of EC Member States' appellate procedures
currently in force to conform these systems to WTO standards.
Examination of whether violation of Community law constitutes a
violation of WTO obligations requires exposition of the status of
Community law. One scholar succinctly stated Community law "is
equivalent to a domestic legal system in that it operates with its own laws
and procedures separate from international law, notwithstanding the fact
that its legal actors include sovereign states."'' The Court of Justice, in
adjudicating an importer's challenge to a tariff classification by an EC
Member State, asserted that Community law "constitutes a new legal order
of international law for the benefit of which states have limited their
sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which
comprise not only the Member States but also their nationals."'8 2
Community law arises "from the Treaties [establishing the Community]
as obligations in public international law," and is therefore sui generis.
The EC "created its own legal system [in contrast to ordinary international
treaties] which.., became an integral part of the legal systems of the

1-3187 as examples of both situations).
179. Lux, supra note 85, at 63-64.
180. Panel Establishment Request, supra note 3, at 2.
181. Ilona Cheyne,InternationalInstrumentsas a Source ofCommunilyLaw, inDEGENERAL
LAW OF E.C. EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supranote 122, at 254-75, 254 n. I (citing Van Gend en Loos,
1963 C.M.L.R. 82).
182. Preliminary Ruling at the Request ofthe TariffAdministration, Case 26/62 Van Gend en
Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 C.M.L.R. 82, 85.
183. Hazel Fox et al., The Reception ofEuropean Community Law into DomesticLaw, in THE
INTEGRATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW INTONATIONAL LEGALORDER
A STUDY OF THE PRACTICE IN EUROPE 27-38 (Pierre Michel Eisemann ed., 1996).
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Member states" assuring the supremacy of Community law to national
legislation.'4
Whether WTO obligations have been incorporated into Community
law, thereby making WTO law directly applicable, is subject to debate."8 5
Nonetheless, the requirements of Article 243 of the Customs Code and

Article X:3(b) are coextensive, as both cover similar, if not the exact same
obligations." 6 Article X:3(b) requires WTO Members to "maintain, or
institute as soon as practicable, judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals
or procedures for the purpose... of the prompt review and correction of
administrative action relating to customs matters," while Article 243
requires EC Member States to provide procedures for "appeal
against.., decisions taken of the customs authorities ...

initially,...

before the customs authorities... [and] subsequently, before an independent body, which may be a judicial authority or an equivalent specialized
body."' 7 Therefore, violation of the Customs Code should constitute a
violation of WTO obligations by the Member States, if they are subject to
WTO obligations, because the provisions are coextensive.' 88 Further, ifEC
Member States are signatories to the WTO treaty, then they are obligated
to comply with the requirement of Article X:3(b) stated above, which is
the same obligation levied upon EC Member States by Community law.' 89

184. Id. at 28 (quoting Costa v. Enel, 1964 E.C.R 585). Whether community law that conflicts
with national constitutional provisions prevails has not been addressed. Id. at 33.
185. See Armin von Bogdandy, Legal Equality, Legal Certainty, & Subsidiarity in
TransnationalEconomic Law, in EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION
STUDIES INTRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW INHONOR OF CLAUS-DIETER EHLERMANN 13-37, 2728 n.70 (Armin Von Bogdany et al. eds., 2002) (noting debate and sources as well as asserting
direct applicability of WTO law pressures national regulatory schemes to harmonize); Steve Peers,
FundamentalRight or PoliticalWhim? WTO Law and the European Courtof Justice,in THE EU
AND THE WTO LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUEs 111-30 (Grainne DeBurca & Joanne Scott
eds., 2001) (summarizing Court of Justice jurisprudence on direct applicability and collecting
sources referencing debate); Ilona Cheyne, Haegeman, Demirel and Their Progency, in THE
GENERAL LAW OF E.C. EXTERNAL RELATIONS, supranote 122, at 20-41, 39-41 (asserting GAlT
1947 provisions were directly applicable to Member States through community law as indicated
by various European Court of Justice decisions).
186. Note that the text of Article X:3(b) of GAIT 1947 was unchanged by the WTO
Agreement. GATT 1947, supra note 4, art. X:3(b). Therefore, under previous community law,
Article X:3(b) was directly applicable to Member States. See id.
187. Id.; Code, supranote 78, art. 243.
188. See generally PIERRE DIDIER, WTO TRADE INSTRUMENTS INEU LAW (1999) (illustrating
EC adopted WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement into Community law through Regulation (EC)
3283/94, 1994 O.J. (L 349) 1 and Regulation (EC) 384/96, 1996 (L 56) 1).
189. Violation of Community law that is not coextensive with WTO obligations is not a
violation of WTO obligations. GATT 1947, supranote 4, art. X:3(b).
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Assessment of whether Member States are full signatories to the WTO
convention, as well as the international legal personality of the EC,
resolves the second issue. Exact definition of the EC as an international
legal entity receives varying interpretations. 90 Scholars define the EC as
a "new . . . political and legal association . . . [founded] under
supranationality ... [meaning] that there are powers or competences
vested in the institutions which have both 'supremacy' vis-i-vis the
Member states and 'direct effect' vis-i-vis the citizens of the Member
states."' 9' Therefore, the EC is a "supranational legal system[,]... an ex
novo creation... [with] its own system of legal concepts... , which is, to
a great extent, different from that employed at the national level."'"
Both the EC and each of its constituent Member States are signatories
to the WTO Agreement.'93 WTO jurisprudence illustrates that a WTO
Member may allege WTO violations against individual EC constituent
states. 1" Because both the EC and its Member States are signatories to the
WTO conventions each maintain separate and distinct international
obligations under WTO treaties. 95 Breach of these obligations is a
violation of international law.'" Enforcement through general public
190. See infra notes 191 & 192.
191. Inger-Johanne Sand, Understandingthe EU/EEA as Systems of FunctionalityDifferent
Processes: Economic, Political, Legal, Administrative and Cultural, in EUROPE'S OTHER:
EUROPEAN LAW BETWEEN MODERNITY AND POSTMODERNITY, 93-109 (Peter Fitzpatrick & James
Henry Bergeron eds., 1998).
192. MARIA LUISA FERNADEZ ESTEBAN, THE RULE OF LAW INTHE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION
xiii (1999) (statement cited is of Professor Luis Maria Diez-Picazo in the Preface).
193. See WTOMemberwebpage forEC, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/
european communitiese.htm (last visited July 17,2005).
194. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Customs Classification of Certain
ComputerEquipment,WT/DS62/AB/P, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, . 1 n.2 (June 5, 1998).
195. See Vienna Convention, supra note 74, art. 26. "Pactasunt servanda. Every treaty in
force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." See id (the
principle also known by the Latin phrase rebus sic stantibus).
196. The Permanent Court of International Justice held "that it is a principle of international
law, and even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation
to make reparation." Chorzow Factory (Merits) Case, P.C.I.J. (ser. A.) No. 17, at 29 (1928). The
concept of breach of the law of nations or ius gentium and its remedy derives from Roman law.
JOHN WESTIAKE, CHAPTERS ON THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 18 (1894). A "state is
responsible for any failure on the part of its organs to carry out international obligations... ." TiM
HILLER, SOURCEBOOK ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 90 (1998) (quoting Draft Code of General
Principles of Law that formed basis of International Court of Justice's constitutive statute Article
38(1)(c)); seegenerally WILHELM G.GREwE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONALLAW (Michael Byers
trans., 2000); AMOS S. HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW (1918); C.H.
STOCKTON, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE USE OF NAVAL OFFICERS 16-18 (1911);
HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1846); see also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 107-37 (2d
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international law of a breach of an actor's international obligations is
limited.' 9 Nevertheless, to affirmatively resolve the second issue raised
above, both the EC and its Member States are separately subject to WTO
obligations and dispute settlement procedures.
Turning to the final issue of whether the WTO may require alteration
of a violating Member's judicial system, at least one eminent scholar
argued that breaches of WTO obligations fall within the scope of remedy
proscribed in DSU Article 19 for a panel to require a Member to bring a
violating measure into conformity according to a binding
recommendation.'98 The scope of a binding recommendation is uncertain,
but previous WTO decisions recognize the specific steps a Member must
initially take to implement a recommendation remain within the sole
discretion of the Member found to violate its WTO obligations.'"

ed. 2002) (discussing and defining effective international rulemaking and implementation
procedures, as well as future mechanisms for rule implementation in WTO).
197. See Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Legal System: Between a Rock and a
HardPlace, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 763-813,766-74 (2000) (discussing customary international law
remedies as cessation of international law violation and a form of reparation to parties injured by
the violation limited to compensation, guarantees of non-repetition of the violating act, or restitutio
in integrum); see generallyJOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW INSTITUTIONS AND PROCEDURES (1999); REMEDIES ININTERNATIONAL LAW:
THE INSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1998).
198. See Robert Hudec, Broadeningthe Scope of Remedies in WTO DisputeSettlement, in
IMPROVING WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES: ISSUES AND LESSONS FROM THE PRACTICE
OF OTHER INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRmUNALS 369-400 (Friedl Weiss ed., 2000) (approving
approach outlined above as articulated in Panel Report, Guatemala-Anti-DumpingInvestigation
RegardingPortlandCementfrom Mexico, WT/DS60/R (June 19, 1998), reversedon appeal by,
WT/DS60/AB/R (Nov. 2, 1998)). Article 19 of the DSU provides:
1. Where a panel or the Appellate Body concludes that a measure is inconsistent
with a covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring
the measure into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its
recommendations, the panel or Appellate Body may suggest ways in which the
Member concerned could implement the recommendations.
2. In accordance with paragraph 2 of Article 3, in their findings and
recommendations, the panel and Appellate Body cannot add to or diminish the
rights and obligations provided in the covered agreements. (footnotes excluded).
199. See Authorities collected in WTO Appellate Body Repertory of Reports and Awards
1995-2004, Arbitration Awards Under Article 21.39(c) of the DSU, availableat http://www.wto.
(last visited July 17, 2005)
org/english/tratop_e/dispu~e/repertorye./arble.htm#ARB.1.1
(illustrating Member's discretion in implementing recommendations). See also WTO Appellate
Body Repertory of Reports and Awards 1995-2004, Review of Implementation of DSB Rulings,
R.4.1-4.3.6(2005),availableathttp://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop_-edispu--e/repertorye/r4_e.htm
(last visited July 17, 2005).
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Although a panel may recommend repeal of a violating measure and
suggest approaches for a Member to alleviate the violation, the panel may
not pronounce a binding remedy that requires a definite method for a
Member to cure a nonconforming measure.200 Yet, if the violating
Member's chosen steps fail to achieve a legally valid solution, then the
complaining Member may resort to DSU Article 21.5 to compel a valid
remedy.20 ' Whether, under DSU 21.5, the WTO may require a Member to
alter its judicial system is resolved by reference to a well-known dispute
concerning the Indian system of patent registration.20 2
The dispute between the United States and India concerned the lack of
protection afforded to "pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products
under Article 27 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property (TRIPS Agreement), or of a means for the filing of
patent applications.., and of legal authority for the granting of exclusive
marketing rights for such products."2 3 The panel found India violated the
TRIPS Agreement and recommended India bring its domestic regime into
200. See Panel Report, United States-Continued Dumping and Offset Act of 2000,
WT/DS217/14,WT/ DS234/22, ARB-2003-1/16,
52 (June 13, 2003) (Arbitrator asserting
recommendation by Panel to repeal legislation not binding on United States).
201. On the authority ofthe WTO Dispute Settlement System, see generally William J.Davey,
Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System Exceeded Its Authority? A ConsiderationofDeference
Shown by the System to Member GovernmentDecisionsandIts UseoflssueAvoidanceTechniques,
4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 79-110 (2001). Article 21.5 of the DSU reads:
Where there is disagreement as to the existence or consistency with a covered
agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings
such dispute shall be decided through recourse to these dispute settlement
procedures, including wherever possible resort to the original panel. The panel
shall circulate its report within 90 days after the date of referral of the matter to
it. When the panel considers that it cannot provide its report within this time
frame, it shall inform the DSB in writing of the reasons for the delay together with
an estimate of the period within which it will submit its report.
202. A number ofscholars address the scope ofremedies available under the WTO Agreement
and propose use of alternate remedies. See Steve Charnovitz, Rethinking Trade Sanctions,95 AM.
J. INT'L L. 792-832 (2001) (suggesting use of DSU authorized non-tariff sanctions and
implementation of new effective compliance mechanism); Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the
WTO Legal System: Between a Rock anda HardPlace, 11 EuR. J. INT'L L. 763, 763-813,800-09
(2000) (discussing WTO enforcement remedies as compensation and countermeasures); Joost
Pauwelyn, Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are Rules-Toward a More
Collective Approach, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 335, 335-47 (2000). See also Joel P. Trachtman, The
Domain of WTO Dispute Resolution, 40 HARV. INT'LL.J. 333, 333-77 (1999).
203. Appellate Body Report, India-PatentProtectionforPharmaceuticalandAgricultural
Chemical Products,WT/DS50/AB/R, 1 (Dec. 17, 1997) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report,
India].
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compliance with WTO obligations. 2' In finding a violation of WTO
obligations, the panel, in essence, asserted India's domestic patent
legislation and administrative organization failed.0 5
Interestingly, the EC, a third party participant in the appeal, asserted
India failed to implement measures required by TRIPS. 206 The Appellate
Body noted the TRIPS Agreement's text permitted Members the freedom
to implement the appropriate method pursuant to domestic law to comply
with TRIPS obligations. 27 Nonetheless, the Body examined India's
domestic law and found India's method of implementing TRIPS failed to
effectuate India's obligations under the Agreement.2 '
Additionally, the Body found India needed to implement an effective
mechanism to protect exclusive marketing rights. 2" The Body
recommended that India bring its "legal regime for patent protection of
pharmaceutical and agricultural chemical products into conformity with
India's obligations... [under] the TRIPS Agreement."21' The Dispute
Settlement Body accepted the Appellate Body's report, and India passed
legislation altering its domestic legal regime relating to patent protection
to conform with its WTO obligations.21
In light of the foregoing case, adoption by the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body of panel or Appellate Body recommendations that a Member bring
its regime into compliance with WTO obligations appears to have the
effect of requiring a Member to substantially alter its domestic legal
regime. In the context of the present dispute, if the EC were found to
violate Article X:3(a), then a panel could recommend the EC bring its
measure into conformity. 212 The means of conformance would be left to
the EC. Yet, the only compliant method would be implementation of a
direct Community-wide review system, as well as enactment by EC
Member States of adequate appellate review mechanisms. 213 Thus, the
effect of a panel conformity recommendation, in the present dispute, is to
defacto require a Member to modify its domestic legal structures. 1 4
204. Id. 2.
205. See id 15 (United States asserted Panel found the Indian system a failure).
206. Id. 23.
207. Id. 59.
208. Appellate Body Report, India, supranote 203, IM 61-71.
209. Id. 84.
210. Id. 98.
211. See Status Report by India, India-Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and
AgriculturalChemical Products, WT/DS50/10/Add.4, WT/DS79/6 (Apr. 16, 1999).
212. See Appellate Body Report, India, supra note 203, n 83, 98.
213. See id.; GATT 1947, supranote 4, art. X:3(b) (read in conjunction with art. X:3(a) WTO
law requires a uniform procedure throughout the community).
214. See WTO Secretariat, Clarificationand Improvement of GA TT Articles V, VIII and X
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C. The ApplicabilityofArticle XXIV:8(ii)
As a former Judge of the Appellate Body noted, an "important task for
Members of the WTO is to ensure that WTO disciplines are effectively
applied to prevent... [customs unions and regional free trade agreements]

from being too exclusive and discriminatory in relation to outside
parties."" Article XXIV:8(ii) pronounces a substantive obligation upon

WTO Members who are part of a customs union to maintain a uniform
customs tariff regime applicable to third party countries importing into the
customs union. 216 This substantive obligation resides within the general
exception Article XXIV grants to customs unions to Article I's
obligations. 2 "7 The scope of such an exception has seldom been subject to
explication through GATT/WTO dispute settlement decisions.2 Only one
WTO dispute extensively dealt with the provisions of Article XXIV, while
Proposalsmade by WTO Members, TN/TF/W/43, at 21 (June 3, 2005) [hereinafter Clarification
of GATr] (citing communication indicating measures needed to ensure uniform administration of
trade measures with introduction of central department within Member governments to interpret
"trade regulations such as those relating to customs classification or customs valuation, etc."); see
WTO Secretariat, Communication by Japan, Mongolia, Chinese Taipei, Pakistan and Peru,
TNITF/W/8 (Jan. 28, 2005). Additionally, the EC has proposed that "procedures for appeal
[adopted by members] should be easily accessible ... , and costs should be reasonable and
commensurate with costs in providing for appeals." Clarification of GATT, supra,at 20 (June 3,
2005). The EC asserts all Members should, "for imports, exports and goods in
transit... be... [obliged] ... to provide a non discriminatory, legal right of appeal against customs
and other agency rulings and decisions, initially within the same agency or other body, and
subsequently to a separate judicial or administrative body." Communication by the European
Communities, TN/TF/W/6,1 7 (Jan. 28, 2005) (a large part ofthe Communication addresses Article
X).
215. SeeMitsuo MatsushitaLegalAspectsofFree TradeAgreements:In the Context ofArticle
XXJVofthe GA 7T1994, in WTO AND EAST ASIANEW PERSPECTIVES 497-514 (Mitsuo Matsushita
& Dukgeun Ann eds., 2004).
216. See GATT, ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE 769 (6th ed. 1994)
(quoting Sept. 1978 notification by EEC regarding use of European Accounting Unit L/4709, Oct.
4, 1978, 2, 4). Cf. JAMES H. MATHIS, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE GATT/WTO
ARTICLE XXIV AND THE INTERNAL TRADE REQUIREMENT (2002) (discussing additional Article
XXIV internal requirements to maintain a customs union).
217. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Conditionsfor the Grantingof Tariff
Preferencesto DevelopingCountries,WT/DS246/AB/R, 81 (Apr. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Appellate
Body Report, TariffPreferences]. See Arim von Bogdany and Tiltman Makatsch, Collision, CoExistance or Co-Operation? Prospectsfor the Relationship Between WTO Law and European
Union Law, in THE EU AND THE WTO LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISsUEs 138-41 (Grainne
DeBurca & Joanne Scott eds., 2001).
218. "The meaning of Article XXIV is by no means clear and amenable to different
interpretations." Matsushita, Legal Aspects of Free Trade Agreements: In the Context of Article
XXJV ofthe GA TT 1994, in WTO AND EAST ASIA NEW PERSPECTIVES, supranote 215, at 499.
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three unadopted GATT panel decisions discussed the Article at length.2 9
Allowance of a customs union within the general WTO scheme of
obligations occurs as a result of the belief such associations encourage and
promote international trade.220
1. General Principles
Originally, Article XXIV provided an exception to Article I's Most
Favored Nation obligation, but the WTO Appellate Body recently
provided a broader reading of Article XXIV as an exception to WTO
obligations-as well as both a general and specific defense against alleged
violations.22 ' The scope of the two defenses are vague, but one may adduce
that the defenses operate in the context of the Appellate Body's belief that
custom unions effectuate trade and are therefore good for the international
trading system.
The definition of a customs union was of central importance to the
Appellate Body in a recent decision.222 As a result, Article XXIV:8(ii)
received substantial explanation.223 The Appellate Body explained that
Article XXIV:8(ii) "establishes the standard for the trade of constituent
members with third countries in order to satisfy the definition of a
'customs union."' 4 The Article requires a common external tariff scheme,
but permits constituent members of customs unions flexibility in
implementing that scheme.225 Members need not apply "the same duties
and other regulations of commerce as other constituent members with
respect to trade with third countries."226 Members of a customs union need
only apply "substantially the same" duties and commerce regulations to
countries outside the customs union.227 The meaning of substantially the
same invokes both qualitative and quantitative considerations, and

219. See Appellate Body Report, TariffPreferences, supra note 217; see infra notes 244,258,

277.
220. Bogdany & Makatsch, Collision, Co-Existance or Co-Operation? Prospects for the
Relationship between WTO Law and European Union Law, in THE EU AND THE WTO LEGAL AND

CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES, supra note 217, at 139; Accord John H. Jackson, Foreword, Perspectives
on Regionalism in Trade Relations, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 873 (1996).
221. Appellate Body Report, Turkey-Restrictions on Imports of Textile andClothingProducts,

WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999), 45 n. 13, 52 [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Restrictions
on Imports].
222. Id. M43, 47-49.
223. Id. IM 49-50.
224. Id. 149.
225. Id.
226. Appellate Body Report, Restrictions on Imports, supra note 221, 149.
227. Id.
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approximates sameness in application of a common tariff to a greater
'
degree than "comparable trade regulations having similar effects."228
Additionally, execution of this common tariff scheme must not raise
barriers to trade with countries outside of the customs union.229
A WTO Member may, if two conditions are satisfied, raise Article
XXIV as a specific defense to breach of a Member's WTO obligations on
grounds that compliance with such obligations prohibits the formation of
a customs union.230 A Member must show by competent evidence that the
measure challenged is compatible with paragraphs 5(a) and 8(a) of Article
XXIV as the first condition for raising the defense.23' Second, the Member
must prove formation of a customs union would be prevented without
introduction of the measure.232
The Appellate Body, possibly retreating from its earlier position that
Article XXIV provides both a general defense and a specific defense, held
in a subsequent case that the defense of Article XXIV may justify a
measure inconsistent with other GATT obligations only when the Member
asserting the defense proves the measure satisfies the above-referenced
two conditions: proving the challenged measure complies with paragraphs
5(a) and 8(a) of Article XXIV; and establishing a formation of a customs
union is prevented without the challenged measure.233 Additionally, the
defense must be raised by the Member against whom a violation is
alleged; therefore, a panel may not sua sponte discuss the applicability of
the defense in a given dispute.2s
Discussion of Article XXIV as an exception to WTO obligations
occurred in the context of an alleged violation of the Agreement on
Safeguards by the United States.2 35 Refusing to address the relationship
between the Agreement and Article XXIV, the Appellate Body asserted
Article XXIV provided an exception to obligations of the Agreement on
Safeguards in only two factual situations:

228. Id.

50.

229. Id. 57 ("purpose set forth in paragraph 4 informs the other relevant paragraphs of
Article XXIV").
230. Id. N 58-61 (describing in detail two conditions necessary for defense).
231. Appellate Body Report, Restrictions on Imports, supranote 221,1 58.
232. Id.
233. Appellate Body Report, Argentina--Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear,
WT/DSI21/AB/R, 109 (Dec. 14, 1999).
234. Id. at I 109-110.
235. Appellate Body Report, UnitedStates-Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
CircularWelded Carbon QualityLine Pipefrm Korea, WT/DS202/AB/R, n 198-199 (Feb. 15,
2002).
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One is when, in the investigation by the competent authorities of a
WTO Member, the imports that are exempted from the safeguard
measure are not consideredin the determination of serious injury.
The other is when, in such an investigation, the imports that are
exempted from the safeguard measure are considered in the
determination of serious injury, andthe competent authorities have
also established explicitly, through a reasoned and adequate
explanation, that imports from sources outside the free-trade area,
alone, satisfied the conditions for the application of a safeguard

measure ....

236

This conclusion read in conjunction with the Appellate Body's
redefinition of the feasibility of the general defense discussed above,
evidences the Body's retreat from its initial holding that Article XXIV
enunciated both a broad general and a specific defense. 237 To the extent
panels will accord with the Body in the limitation of the general defense
is uncertain, but the present dispute could clarify the Body's position-if
the defense is raised and the panel decision is appealed.
In any case, the alleged violation must be shown by the complaining
Member in order for a panel to evaluate the applicability of the Article
XXIV defense claimed by the alleged violator. 238 Therefore, the burden of
proof remains upon the complaining Member to prove an initial violation
of WTO obligations."3 9
2. Unadopted GATT Panel Jurisprudence
The Appellate Body, in rendering its decision on the Article XXIV
defense, referred to unadopted GATT panel decisions addressing the scope

236. Id. 198.
237. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, Toward Open Recognition Standardization and
Regional Integration Under Article XMIV of GA T, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 459 (2003) (discussing
WTO consistency of various trade agreements under Safeguards).
238. Panel Report, Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Automotive Industry,

WT/DS139/R,WT/DS142/R,

10.51 (Feb. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report, Canada-

Automotive Industry].

239. On the burden of proof, see generally Panel Report, United States-Anti-Dumping
Measures on Oil Country Tublar Goods (OTCG) from Mexico, WT/DS282/R, 7.8 (June 20,
2005); Appellate Body Report, UnitedStates-MeasureAffecting Imports of Woven Wool Shirts

and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R, at 12-17 (Apr. 25,

1997); Panel Report,

Turkey-Restrictionson Imports of Textile and ClothingProducts,WT/DS34/R, M9.57-9.58 n.286

(May 31, 1999); Panel Report, Argentina-MeasuresAffecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles,
Apparel and Other Items, WT/DS56/R, IM 6.34-6.40 (Mar. 27, 1998).
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of Article XXIV.4 Generally, WTO jurisprudence asserts that
adopted panel reports are an important part of the GATT acquis.
They are often considered by subsequent panels. They create
legitimate expectations among WTO Members, and, therefore,
should be taken into account where they are relevant to any dispute.
However, they are not binding, except with respect to resolving the
particular dispute between the parties to that dispute.24
Moreover, the Appellate Body held
unadoptedpanelreports "have no legal status in the GATT or WTO
system since they have not been endorsed through decisions by the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to GATT or WTO Members."
Likewise, we agree "a panel could nevertheless find useful
guidance in the reasoning of an unadopted panel report that it
considered to be relevant." 242
Thus, future reference to the GATT panel decisions referred to in the
Appellate Body's Article XXIV decision may continue to inform WTO
law. 3 Analysis of these panel decisions follows.
a. EC-Citrus Products
The first dispute to address the scope of Article XXIV occurred in
1985. 24 The United States complained that tariff preferences granted by
240. Appellate Body Report, Tariff Preferences, supra note 217, n.13. See also WTO
Appellate Body Repertory of Reports and Awards 1995-2004, Status ofPanelandAppellateBody
Reports, S.8.1-2 (2005) (collecting authorities discussing applicability of previous GATT
precedent), availableathttp://www.wto.orgenglish/tratope/dispu e/repertorye/ss_e.htm#S.8. 1
(last visited July 17, 2005).
241. Appellate Body Report, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DSS/AB/R,
WT/DSIO/AB/R, WT/DSIl/AB/R, at 14-15 (Oct. 4, 1996).
242. Id. at 97.
243. See Appellate Body Shrimp Report, supranote 47, IM108-109; Agreement Establishing
VWTO, supra note 4, art. 16(1):

Except as otherwise provided for under this Agreement or the Multilateral
Trade Agreements, the WTO shall be guided by the decisions, procedures
and customary practices followed by the CONTRACTING PARTIES of
the GATT 1947 and the bodies established in the framework of the GATT
1947.
244. Panel Report, EuropeanCommunit-TariffTreatmentonImportson Citrus Productsfrom
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the EC to a number of Mediterranean countries for importation of citrus
fruits negatively impacted American exports of similar citrus fruit to the
EC.245 The EC had established agreements with a number of these
Mediterranean countries, and submitted the agreements to the GATT for
approval as interim agreements leading to the formation of a customs
union.2' The panel found that Part IV and Article XXIV "constituted
distinct sets of rights and obligations and that measures taken under one
'
could not be covered by the other."247
The adherence to the "precise
criteria" of Article XXIV was required.248 Yet, the panel asserted that it
lacked jurisdiction to pass upon whether the EC agreements complied with
Article XXV's provisions because no decision by the GATT Council
occurred approving the agreements. 9 Had the GATT Council approved
these agreements as consistent with Article XXIV, then a contracting party
could not challenge the agreements as nullifying or impairing benefits
accruing under the GATT.25 ° The challenged agreements were not so
approved, and therefore the panel found the preferential tariff scheme
adversely affected American exporters of citrus fruit by upsetting the
" ' This
balance of rights and obligations under Articles I and XXIV.25
upsetting of rights and obligations disadvantaged the United States as a
non-member of the EC agreements, and therefore "entitled [the United
States] to offsetting or compensatory adjustment to the extent that the
grant of the preferences had caused
substantial adverse effects to its actual
252
trade or its trade opportunities.,
Further, the panel addressed the relationship between Article XXIV
and Article XXII. 253 Article XXIII provided for remedy of a nullification
or impairment by one Contracting Party of another Contracting Party's
GATT rights, and set out special procedures for the Contracting Parties to
utilize in assessing a measure's conformity with GATT obligations.2 ' The
Certain Countries in the Mediterranean Region, [15776 (Feb. 7, 1985) [hereinafter Panel Report,
Citrus Products].
245. Id. 3.1.
246. Id. ". 2.9, 2.10, 3.2 (some agreements submitted as free trade areas).
247. Id. 4.11 (Part IV refers to nonreciprocal treatment in trade negations between developed
and developing nations); see generally WTO SECRETARIAT, REGIONALISM AND THE WORLD
TRADiNG SYSTEM 15-16 (1995).
248. Id.
249. Panel Report, Citrus Products, supra note 244, N 4.14, 4.15 (Panel found terms of
reference excluded analysis of EC agreements consistency with provisions of Article XXIV).
250. Id. 4.19.
251. Id. 4.37.
252. Id.
253. Id. 74.16.
254. See GATT 1947, supra note 4, art. XXIII.
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panel refrained, without a special mandate, from analyzing agreements
challenged for conformity with GATT obligations-particularly if such
agreements satisfied the requirements of Article XXIV.255
The dispute illustrates the ability of the panel process to address
regional agreements lacking approval by the GATT Council for
compliance with GATT obligations. This principle may be relevant to the
present dispute, since the agreement enlarging the EC customs union has
yet to be approved by the WTO. Further, the panel decision highlights the
distinctiveness of obligations within GATT Articles, and may set down a
general principle that a violator of GATT obligations can not solely assert
compliance with alternative Articles as providing a general exception to
GATT obligations.25 Finally, the decision infers deference to specific
procedures applicable to a dispute over general GATT provisions."'
b. EC-Bananas I
In another dispute, the EC argued Article XXIV, in connection with

Part IV, permitted a portion of EC Member States to apply a preferential
tariff scheme.258 The EC's theory declared Article XXIV:8 only obligated
Members to remove restrictive internal importation regulations relating
solely to developed Members thereby permitting such restrictions relating

to developing countries.259 The panel concluded Article XXIV applied
only in situations in which a challenged measure fell within the rubric of
a customs union or free trade area. Reasoning invocation of Article
XXIV for any agreement would deprive other contracting parties the right
to investigate the matter pursuant to Article XXIII, the panel held Article
XXIV trumped Article XXIII only in a situation where the agreement
challenged was prima facie covered by Article XXIV.2"" Finding the
agreement currently under challenge covered by Article XXIV, the panel
nonetheless found Article XXIV, coupled with Part IV, did not permit EC
Member States to retain restrictive regulations or fail to liberalize trade

255. Id.
256. Cf discussion of Article XXIV as a general exception in section C, subsection 1 of the
text.
257. Panel Report, Citrus Products,supra note 244, IM3.27,4.16.
258. Panel Report, EEC-MemberStates'ImportRegimesfor Bananas,91364, DS/32/R (June
3, 1993) [hereinafter Panel Report for Bananas].
259. Id.
260. Id. 367.
261. Id. In the Panel's words: "only in those cases in which the agreement for which Article
XXIV was invoked was prima facie the type of agreement covered by this provision, i.e., on the
face of it capable ofjustification under it." Id.
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with developing countries along the same tariff preferential scheme as
applied to developed countries. 62
Therefore, the panel opined, Part IV does not modify contracting
parties' obligations pursuant to Article XXIV. 2 3 Neither does Part IV
create an additional exception to Article I's Most Favored Nation
principle.2" The addition of Part IV to the GATT did not reflect a
subtraction of contracting parties obligations under already established
GATT obligations.26 The panel found the preferential tariff scheme
applied in a portion
of the EC Member States was not justified under
2
Article XXIV. 66
Additionally, the panel reasoned that Article XXIV:5-8 provided an

exception to GATT obligations solely for the purpose of forming or
entering into an interim agreement to form a customs union or free trade
area.26 ' The Article did not provide a general exception to GATT

obligations, nor permit a universal justification for restrictive import

measures. 268 Thus, the EC's Member States provision for such restrictive
import measures violated Article I and could not be justified by Article
XXIV.269 Yet, the measure might be justified if ratified by the contracting

parties pursuant to Article XXV.2 ° Article XXV:5 provided a mechanism
for contracting parties, by two-thirds vote of the parties, to permit a waiver
of GATT obligations in an exceptional circumstance.Y

262. Id. 372.
263. Panel Report for Bananas, supra note 258, 371.
264. Id.
265. Id. Part IV places additional obligations on developed contracting parties.
266. Id. 374 (scheme violated Article XI:2(c)(i)).
267. Id. 358.
268. Panel Report for Bananas, supra note 258, 358.
269. Id. 375.
270. Id.
271. Such a waiver was obtained by the EC regarding its banana importation scheme. See
Ministerial Decision, European Communities-TransitionalRegimefortheECAutonomous Tariff
Rate Quotas on Imports ofBananas, WT/MIN(01)/16 (Nov. 14,2001). The text of Article XXV:5
reads:
In exceptional circumstances not elsewhere provided for in this Agreement, the
CONTRACTING PARTIES may waive an obligation imposed upon a contracting
party by this Agreement; Provided that any such decision shall be approved by a
two-thirds majority of the votes cast and that such majority shall comprise more
than half of the contracting parties. The CONTRACTING PARTIES may also by
such a vote
(i) define certain categories of exceptional circumstances to which other voting
requirements shall apply for the waiver of obligations, and
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The panel decision recognizes the tension between Article XXIV and
Article XXHI. This panel rejected the notion that Article XXIV's specific
procedures for reviewing a customs union's compatibility with GATT
obligations prohibited a contracting party, not party to the customs union,
from adjudicating a claim for violation under the Article XXII panel
process. 7 2 The decision lays down the general principle that an alleged

violation is justiciable by a panel consistent with Article XXLII. 27 3
Additionally, the panel's reasoning asserts Article XXIV does not act as
an exclusionary clause insulating measures adopted by a customs union in
contravention of GATT obligations from panel review.2 4 Finally, the
panel reminds the disputants of the procedural ability of contracting parties

to obtain consent from two-thirds of the contracting parties to maintain
Such consent excludes the measure from
GATT inconsistent measures.275
2
challenge under Article XXII.
c. EC-Bananas II
Another dispute discussing the EC's importation of bananas, focused
on the new Community-wide tariff scheme effective in 1993, which
abolished "the 20 per cent advalorem bound tariff rate, applied in all EEC
member states except Germany[,] quantitative restrictions on imports
imposed by several member states of the EEC, and preferential tariffs
accorded to African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries."2 " The new
uniform tariff scheme provided specific duties for the importation of
bananas from non-EC Member States and non-ACP free trade area
countries, as well as quotas and an import licensing requirement.2 8 The
EC argued that a panel established pursuant to Article XXII to investigate
whether a nullification or impairment of GATT rights could not assess a
free trade agreement's conformity with GATT provisions because Article
XXIV:7 mandated special procedures available solely to the contracting

(ii) prescribe such criteria as may be necessary for the application of this
paragraph.
GATT 1947, supra note 4, art. XXV:5.
272. Panel Report for Bananas, supra note 258, 1M 365-367.
273. See id. 367.
274. Id.
275. Id. IN 372, 375.
276. Id.
277. Panel Report, EEC-Import Regime for Bananas,

128, DS/38/R, (Feb. 11, 1994)

[hereinafter Panel Report on EEC-Bananas].
278. Id. IN 128, 129.
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parties to decide a free trade agreement's conformity with GATT
obligations.279
The panel first considered whether the EC's free trade agreement with
the ACP countries was a type of agreement covered under Article
XXIV. 210 The panel undertook this investigation because if the EC were
allowed to simply raise Article XXIV as a shield to "deprive all other
contracting parties of their procedural rights under Article XXIII:2, and
therefore also of the effective protection of their substantive rights, in
particular those under Article 1:1," then no contracting party could
challenge the provisions of a free trade agreement.28 '
The panel's examination of the provisions of the EC-ACP free trade
agreement concluded that the agreement, by its own terms, was not of a
type covered under Article XXIV. 212 The agreement failed the definition
of Article XXIV:8(b) because the "obligation to liberalize the trade in
products originating in all of the constituent territories" within the
meaning of the Article was not satisfied.283 Therefore, the agreement was
not a free trade agreement as recognized under GATT. 2" As a result,
Article XXIV did not provide a justification to the EC's violation of its
Article I obligations.285
The panel decision follows the reasoning set out in EC-Bananas 1.286
Article XXIV does not exclude review of a customs union's compliance
with GATT obligations simply because the Article provides specific
review procedures.287 Article XXIII mandates a method for contracting
parties to challenge another party's GATT inconsistent measures.2 8 Also,
the decision indicates that Article XXIV, if complied with, justifies
measures otherwise inconsistent with GATT obligations.2 9
3. WTO Responses to Issues Raised in Unadopted GATT Panel Reports
The Appellate Body, referring to EC-Citrus Products and EC-Bananas
I, addressed whether the specific review mechanism of Article XXIV
279. Id. 156.
280. Id.I 157, 158 (Panel noted examination by working parties of EC-ACP agreements did

not reference Article XXIV).
281. Id. 158.
282. Panel Report on EEC-Bananas, supra note 277,

159.

283. Id.
284. Id. 164.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id.
Id.M 156-158.
Panel Report on EEC-Bananas,supra note 277,
Id.
Id. M 162, 164, 170.
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precluded panel review in an Article XXIII proceeding of a measure
alleged to be inconsistent with WTO obligations.2 One of the disputants,
India, espoused a theory, echoing the EC's contention in EC-Bananas I
and II, that a panel could not substantively review a free trade area,
customs union, or interim agreement leading to the formation of either
because that right of review rested solely through the specific review
procedures of Article XXIV:7.29 ' India asserted a balance must exist
between the political and judicial bodies of the WTO in order for the
competences of such bodies to remain respectfully distinct from each
other.292 Therefore, India argued, "there is a principle of institutional
balance which requires panels, in determining the scope of their
competence, to take into account the competence conferred upon other
organs of the WTO." 293 The Appellate Body concluded
no principle of
294
law.
WTO
within
or
under
exists
balance
institutional
In rejecting the existence of a principle of institutional balance, the
Appellate Body affirmed prior GATT jurisprudence articulated in the
unadopted panel decisions discussed above. 295 The Body affirmed the
ability of a panel, pursuant to Article XXIII, to adjudicate an Article XXIV
measure's compliance with WTO obligations. 29' The Body's decision
implicitly rejected the EC's contention, articulated in EC-Bananas I and
II, that a panel lacked authority to review a measure's conformity with
GATT/WTO obligations because a specific review mechanism existed.297
The ability of a panel to review a customs union's compliance with
Article XXIV in order to receive its benefits was confirmed in a WTO
panel decision.29 Like the panel in EC-Bananas II, this WTO panel

290. Appellate Body Report, India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural,
Textile and Industrial Products, I9 11, 12, 53, WT/DS90/AB/R,(Aug. 23, 1999) [hereinafter
Appellate Body Report, India-Quantitative Restrictions].
291. Id. (India propounded argument in context of balance-of-payments dispute asserting
Article XXVIII: 12 and the Balance of Payments Agreement conferred power of review upon bodies
other than panels disallowing panel review of alleged violation pursuant to Article XXVIII:B).
292. See id.
293. Id. 98.
294. Id. 100.
295. See Panel Report for Bananas, supra note 258,
365-367; Panel Report on
EEC-Bananas, supra note 277, IM 156-158.
296. Appellate Body Report, India-Quantitative Restrictions, supra note 290, 100.
297. See Luzius Wasescha, Article Part IV: Grouping on WTO DSU Reform: Proposal
Relating to First-Level Permanent Panel Comment on a WTO Permanent Panel Body, 6 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 224, 226 (2003) (arguing professional panel would reach same conclusion as Appellate
Body that DSU grants authority to Panel to review consistency of regional trade agreements for
compliance with WTO obligations).
298. Panel Report, Canada-Automotive Industry, supra note 238, In 10.53-10.57.
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substantively reviewed the challenged measure to determine if it met the
definition of Article XXIV:8, as a free trade area. 2" The challenged
practice involved an import exemption for automobiles entering Canada
from the United States and Mexico. 00 The EC argued that a free trade area
did not exist between Canada and Mexico despite the NAFTA
agreement. 30 ' The panel found the import exemption provided duty-free
treatment to both members of the alleged free trade area, as well as to nonmembers of the alleged free trade area.3 2 Additionally, the import
exemption did not provide "for duty-free treatment of imports of products
of parties to a free-trade area" because application of the measure failed
uniformly to exempt automobiles originating in the United States and
Mexico in certain instances. 30 3 The panel ruled the measure did not satisfy
the conditions of Article XXIV:8 for a valid free trade area, and therefore
found Article XXIV inapplicable as a justification of a violation of other
WTO obligations.
Review of WTO jurisprudence confirms WTO dispute resolution
bodies have adopted a number of the principles expressed in the three
previous unadopted GATT panel decisions.30 5 Continued reference to the
general precepts announced in the GATT panel decisions in WTO dispute
resolution bodies will further define the scope of Article XXIV and its
place within the dispute settlement process. The next section addresses
another GATT panel decision, which may assist WTO panels or the
Appellate Body in the resolution of disputes similar to the current dispute
between the United States and the EC.
D. A Similarly SituatedCase and PossibleSolution to the Conundrum:
Chile v. EC
Another GATT panel decision directly addressed the clash between
Article X:3(a) and Article XXIV. The panel report, adopted by the GATT
Council, did not render a direct opinion on how the two Articles related to
one another, but offered a possible solution. 3 6 The dispute pitted Chile

299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id.IM 10.55-10.57.
Id. M 10.55-10.56.
Id. 10.53.
Id. 10.55.
Panel Report, Canada-Automotive Industry, supra note 238,

10.56.

304. Id.-W10.57, 11.1

305. See Appellate Body Report, India--Quantitative Restrictions, supra note 290, 100;
Panel Report, Canada-Automotive Industry, supra note 238, I 10.51-10.57.
306. Panel Report, European Economic Community-Restrictions on Imports of Dessert
Apples-Complaint by Chile, 6.3, 1J6491 (Apr. 18, 1989) GATT B.I.S.D. (36th Supp.), at 93
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against the EC over, inter alia, disparate import licensing requirements
across 30the
ten Member States of the EC for importation of dessert
7
apples.
Chile alleged the separate and distinct requirements to obtain an import
license in each of the EC Member States violated Article X:3(a)'s
obligation to uniformly administer a Member's customs laws. °s
Specifically, Chile argued "the problem was not whether the licenses were
administered in an identical manner in all member states, but that in some
of them the licenses were restrictive and non-automatic in character," as
well as lacking reciprocity between Member States.3° Chile also alleged
the EC's licensing scheme was unreasonable because licenses lasted only
one month and asserted the entire licensing scheme favored certain
national importers while disadvantaging others, thereby causing the system
to be partially administered. 10
The panel found the EC licensing scheme applied to all EC Member
States and was administered in a "substantially uniform manner. 3 1' The
"minor administrative variations" regarding the application and securing
of an import license did not constitute a breach of Article X:3(a). 312' Thus,
the panel opined there was no need to consider whether "the requirement
of 'uniform' administration of trade regulations was applicable to the
13
Community as a whole or to each of its Member states individually."
The panel did not discuss arguments alleging the licensing scheme was
unreasonable and partial. 1 4
The panel failed to address a crucial question of whether Article X:3(a)
required either uniform administration of an EC Council Regulation by its
Member States, or the Member States to administer internal law
uniformly, or both. Notwithstanding that failure, the panel decision
utilized the key phrase, "substantially uniform" to describe how the EC
administered its licensing scheme.31 5 Use of this phrase suggests the panel
interpreted Article XXIV:8(ii) as permitting members of a customs union

[hereinafter Panel Report. DessertApples].
307. .
308.
309.
310.
311.

Id. 6.4.
Id. 6.3.
Id. 6.4.
Panel Report, Dessert Apples, supranote 306,

12.30.

312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See id. (no mention of these arguments in Panel's findings).
315. Id. 12.30.
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to employ substantially similar customs duties and commercial
regulations.3t 6
The panel then took Article XXIV:8(ii)'s allowance of substantially
similar regulations within a customs union and amalgamated Article
X:3(a)'s requirement of uniform administration to produce the phrase
"substantially uniform."3 7 This substantially uniform standard would
harmonize the language of Article X:3(a) and XXIV:8(ii) by creating a
separate method of evaluation for conformity with WTO obligations for
a measure implemented in a customs union.
Under the substantially uniform formulation, Article XXIV: 8(ii) would
not serve as a defense permitting a WTO inconsistent measure. Rather,
substantially similar would serve to modify Article X:3(a) obligations for
customs unions. The modified Article X:3(a) obligation of a customs
union to apply its commercial and customs regulations in a substantially
uniform manner in regards to third countries would alter WTO obligations
for a customs union, but would preserve the internal consistency of the
WTO Articles. Yet, such a formulation varies from the GATT panel in
EC-Citrus Product's assertion of the distinctness of WTO obligations. 31 '
However, the substantially uniform standard effectuates the plain meaning
of the Article's text in permitting a customs union to implement and
administer substantially similar trade regulations throughout the union. 9
With the adoption of the DSU and its procedural mandates, as well as
prior decisions of the Appellate Body,
only WTO Members have the authority to amend the covered
agreements or to adopt... interpretations [d]etermining what the
rights and obligations under the covered agreements ought to be [,
and therefore it] is not the responsibility of panels and the Appellate
Body; it is clearly the responsibility solely of the Members of the
320
WTO.

316. Id.
317. Cf GATT 1947, supra note 4, art. X:3(a), with id.art. XXIV:8(ii) (language in both
articles conjoined results in phrase substantially uniform).
318. See Panel Report, Citrus Products,supranote 244, 4.11.
319. Cf DSU, supra note 5, arts. 3.2, 19.2 (providing Panel recommendations may not
diminish or add to obligations under the agreements covered by the DSU). See also Contribution
ofthe UnitedStates,TN/DS/W/74, at 2-3 (Mar. 15,2005) (querying whether panels have the ability
to fill gaps if the treaty is silent).
320. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Measures on CertainProductsfrom the
EuropeanCommunities, WT/DS 165/AB/,
92 (Dec. 11, 2000).
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As discussed above, unadopted GATT panel reports may guide a WTO
panel's reasoning and a WTO panel may adopt the reasoning expressed in
the unadopted GATT panel report. The substantially uniform formulation,
presented by the GATT EC-Citrus panel might provide guidance to the
present panel or the Appellate Body in addressing the allegations
presented by the United States. The Appellate Body previously held, "we
have difficulty in envisaging circumstances in which a panel could add to
the rights and obligations of a Member of the WTO if its conclusions
reflected a correct interpretation and application of provisions of the
covered agreements. 3 21 Should the present panel adopt the reasoning of
the prior GATT panel, it may be providing an appropriate interpretation
of Article X, the covered agreement. Yet, given the prohibition on panels
or the Appellate Body altering the scope of Member's obligations, the
need for an agreement by the WTO Members on the interpretation of
Article X and Article XXIV may be necessary to adopt the substantially
uniform standard. 22 Thus, the Members could adopt the substantially
uniform standard and reconcile the obligations of these two Articles by
ratification of an Understanding on the Application of Article X's
obligations to members of Article XXIV customs or trade unions.
E. BriefDiscussionofArticle XXI.

12

The applicability of paragraph 12 of Article XXIV to the present
dispute requires exploration. The text of Article XXIV: 12 reads: "Each
contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be available
to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by the
regional and local governments and authorities within its territories." The
relation of this paragraph to Article XXIV:8(ii) and Article X:3(a) in the
context of a customs union is unclear. Reference to two GATT panel
decisions provides useful guidance in determining the relation.
In the Chile-EC dispute, Chile alleged the EC violated Article
XXIV: 12 by non-uniform administration of the import licensing scheme
through its Member States. 23 Chile argued the EC's responsibility for
trade policy, coupled with implementation of the import licensing
regulations, required the EC to "be held responsible for seeing that
member states administered this system in accordance with Article X."324

321.
WT/DS1
322.
323.

Appellate Body Report, Chile-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS87/AB/R,
10/AB/R, 79 (Dec. 13, 1999).
GATT 1947 supra note 4, art. XXIV:12.
Panel Report, Dessert Apples, supra note 307, 7.1.

324. Id.
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The EC argued Article XXIV: 12 was an exception to GATT obligations.325
The panel did not address either arguments.3 26
Another dispute involved a challenge to the Canadian legal scheme,
which regulated importation of alcoholic beverages from foreign
countries.3 27 Under Canadian law, importation of foreign alcoholic
beverages fell under federal law, but the federal parliament had enacted
legislation delegating to provincial authorities the right to regulate
importation of such beverages into their territories-provided importation
fell under an exception to the general federal restriction on foreign
importation of alcoholic beverages.3 28 Additionally foreign liquor
producers could not import unless compliance with provincial law was
achieved.3 29 Each province enacted differing requirements for importation
of liquor into their separate territories.33
Parties to the dispute agreed that the provincial authorities responsible
for regulating foreign liquor were regional authorities under Article
XXIV:12.331 The panel ruled that Article XXIV was not an exception to
GATT obligations, but "merely qualified the obligation to implement the
provisions of the General Agreement in relation to measures taken by
regional and local governments and authorities. 332 Therefore, GATT
obligations were directly applicable to the regional authorities because the
text of Article XXIV provided that GATT obligations are observed by the
regional and local governments and such observation may only take place
if the obligations are directly applicable.333
The panel found the different practices violated Canadian's GATT
obligations and analyzed whether all reasonable measures were undertaken
by the federal government to ensure provincial compliance with GATT.3"4
The panel asserted "Canada would have to show that it had made a serious,
persistent and convincing effort to secure compliance by the provincial
liquor boards with the provisions of the General Agreement" in order to

325. Id. 7.2.
326. See id. N 12.1, 13.1 (panel did not reference or address article XXIV:12 argument).
327. Panel Report, Canada-Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks By
Provincial Marketing Agencies, Oct. 16, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.), at 27, 2.1 (1991)
[hereinafter Panel Report, Alcoholic Drinks].
328. Id.
329. Id. 2.2.
330. Id.
331. Id. 5.35.
332. Panel Report, Alcoholic Drinks, supra note 327, 5.36.
333. Id.
334. Id. 5.37.
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justify its breach of GATT.335 After surveying the various procedures
employed by the separate provinces, the panel found Canada had violated
Article XXIV: 12 by failing to evidence a serious, persistent, and
convincing effort to secure compliance with GATT provisions.336
Article XXIV: 12 is not an exception to GATT obligations, but rather
a modification, as indicated by prior GATT practice.337 The requirement
of a customs union to ensure compliance by its constituent local
governments with WTO obligations follows from the placement of
paragraph 12 within the Article expressly enumerating the obligations of
custom unions.33 Paragraph 1 of Article XXIV declares "each such
customs territory shall, exclusively for the purposes of the territorial
application of this Agreement, be treated as though it were a contracting
party . . . ,339 The obligation to evidence a serious, persistent, and
convincing effort to secure compliance with GATT provisions by the EC
application of its common
of its Member States' governments with the
34
follows.
regulations
commercial
and
tariff
Chile's argument that Article X applies to Article XXIV: 12 remains
unresolved.34' If Article X:3(a)'s obligation for uniform administration
applies, then a customs union would need to ensure uniform administration
by its members of the common tariff and commercial regulations (i.e., to
uniformly administer import regulations). Again, a harmonization of the
two Articles occurs if Article X:3(a) modifies Article XXIV: 12 to require
a customs union to administer import regulations in a substantially
uniform manner. Thus, the EC would need to ensure reasonable measures
directed Member States to administer the common import regulations in
a substantially uniform manner.
F. A Final Consideration

GATT/WTO dispute resolution decisions have referenced the disparate
treatment resulting from differing application of administrative customs
regulations by several Member States.342 Two recent panel decisions
addressing Article II violations necessitate consideration because of the

335. Id.
336. Id.
I 5.37-5.40.
337. GATr 1947, supra note 4, art. XXIV:1.
338. Panel Report, Alcoholic Drinks, supra note 327,15.36.

339. GAIT 1947, supra note 4, art. XXIV: 1.
340. See Panel Report, Alcoholic Drinks, supra note 327,

9 5.37-5.40.

341. Appellate Body Report, Restrictions on Imports, supra note 221, 149.

342. See infra notes 343, 349.
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reasoning articulated in the decisions as well as each panel's description
of EC custom practices.
1. Brazil v. EC
The dispute alleged a violation of Article II for lack of uniformity in
the EC in tariff classification of certain computer equipment and

application of the EC's tariff concession schedule.343 Important for the
present dispute is the fact the Appellate Body noted evidence before the
panel illustrated that "during the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations, the
practice regarding the classification of LAN equipment by customs
authorities throughout the European Communities was not consistent." 3"
The Appellate Body further asserted that the EC is a customs union, and
the panel erred in assessing Member States classification of LAN
equipment rather than the practice of the EC as a whole.345 The panel
needed to analyze the export market, which was the EC and not the
individual Member States.'
Again, this dispute did not allege violation of Article XXIV, but it
evidenced that the Appellate Body has noted inconsistent administration
of the common external tariff scheme by EC Member States. 7 It is
unclear whether Article XXIV's acceptance of substantially similar
application of a custom union's common external tariff underlies the
Appellate Body's statement. Nonetheless, under the above-articulated
jurisprudence of Article XXIV, substantially similar is defined as reaching
a degree of sameness.3 48 Application of completely different tariff
classifications to the same product by different Member States must
evidence a lack of substantially similar administration of a common
external tariff scheme.
2. Brazil & Thailandv. EC

Notwithstanding the discussion above, a recent WTO panel report
found EC customs classification practices "consistent" in regards to Brazil
and Thailand's challenge of EC tariff classification of "frozen, boneless
cuts of poultry impregnated with salt in all parts, with a salt content by
343. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Customs Classificationof Certain
ComputerEquipment WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R, IM 1, 57, 92 (June 5,
1998).

344. Id. 95.
345.
346.
347.
348.

Id. 96.
Id
Id. 95.
See supranote 228.
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weight of 1.2%" pursuant to TARIC. 19 The dispute focused on whether
the EC violated Article II by issuing a regulation altering the TARIC
classification of frozen cuts of poultry, resulting in "treatment for certain
products that is less favourable than that provided for" in the EC's tariff
schedule. 5 ° In the context of resolving the dispute, the EC acknowledged
that certain customs offices issued BTIs for the same goods under different
tariff chapter classifications, such that a "substantial [amount of] trade
entered the European Communities under this incorrect interpretation."35'
The EC contended these BTIs were not followed by other EC Member
customs authorities.352 Thailand noted the EC's obligation under Article
X:3(a) to uniformly administer its customs laws.35 3 Additionally, Thailand
noted the EC's internal law obligating the Commission to harmonize
customs law in the EC.3"4 Thailand asserted the EC, with knowledge of the
divergent BTIs, failed to harmonize classification throughout the
Community. 355 The EC responded that approximately 30,000 BTIs are
issued each year, and that "there were substantial problems
communicating BTIs as a result of a lack of interoperability of computer
systems and that the EC Commission only had one official and two
administrative assistants monitoring all issues with respect to the first 40
chapters of the CN during the period prior to 2001. "356 Hence, over a
period from 1996 to 2002 the EC acknowledged Member States classified
frozen poultry under an "incorrect" TARIC sub-chapter heading, which
arose through issuance of BTIs by separate EC Member States
unbeknownst to the EC until 2001.
The panel asserted, "BTIs may be useful to provide an indication of
how products with a particular set of characteristics are being classified by
the importing Member., 351The EC acknowledged divergent classification
and failed to submit statistical information regarding classification during

349. Panel Report, EC-FrozenChicken, supra note 88, I 1.1, 7.265.
350. Id. 7.1;seealsoid. 1.3,2.1.
351. Id. 7.260.
(recall that under the Customs Code other national customs authorities must recognize
352. Id.
BTIs issued by other Member States).
353. Id. 7.263.
7.263 (reminding EC that
354. Panel Report, EC-Frozen Chicken, supra note 88,
Commission possesses authority to intervene once varying national BTIs are discovered pursuant
to community law).
355. Id.(again recall Community legislation provides a specific remedy for the situation

described).
356. Id. 7.264.
357. Id. M7.264, 7.269.
358. Id. 7.271.
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the 1996 to 2002 timeframe as required by the panel.359 Nonetheless, on
the basis of BTIs submitted by the EC, all of which classified the
merchandise under the same subheading, the panel ruled EC classification
consistent during 1996-2002."6 The panel did find a violation of Article
II on the basis of the lack of direction to the customs authorities in
determining the proper classification of the merchandise under the
" '
appropriate sub-chapter heading.36
These two disputes evidence a recognition that the EC falls short of its
articulated uniformity in internal legislation. The Brazil and Thailand
dispute recognizes that EC customs practices are inconsistent and
illustrates an uneasiness of how to address the situation.3 62 Both disputes
deal with the notion of inconsistent practice peripherally, but reveal an
uneasiness to tackle the apparent issue that such practice is in and of itself
a violation of WTO obligations.363
IV. TOWARDS

GREATER TRADE FACILITATION

Both the present dispute and the past disputes analyzed above occur
against the backdrop of the larger global project called trade facilitation.
The notion of trade facilitation grows out of the desire for private industry
to import and export goods globally with the assistance of technology and
minimal administrative burdens. 3" Addressing trade facilitation's impact
359. Panel Report, EC-Frozen Chicken, supranote 88, 7.269.
360. Id. 7.270, 7.275.
361. Id. 17.328. The Panel held
the lack of certainty associated with the application of the criterion of long-term
preservation with respect to the concession contained in heading 02.10 of the EC
Schedule runs counter to one of the objects and purposes of the WTO Agreement
and the GATT 1994, namely that the security and predictability of the reciprocal
and mutually advantageous arrangements must be preserved.
Id.
362. See Panel Report, EC-Frozen Chicken, supra note 88, INJ 7.260, 7.264, 7.269, 7.270,
7.275.
363. In regards to the appropriateness of a Panel deciding a classification dispute, rather than
referring the matter to the WCO, the Panel asserted, "We understand that, once seized of a matter,
Article 11 prevents a panel from abdicating its responsibility to the DSB. In other words, in the
context of the present case, we lack the authority to refer the dispute before us to the WCO or to
any other body." Id. 1 7.56.
364. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, supranote 1, 27; PETER GALLAGHER, THE FiRSTTEN
YEARS OF THE WTO 1995-2005, at 39 (2005); United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,
Trade Facilitation: An Introduction to the Basic Concepts and Benefits, ECEIRADE/289 (2002),
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upon the present dispute suggests a broader remedy incorporating the
goals of facilitation and the need for greater transatlantic harmonization of
customs procedures to ensure disputes, such as the current one, are
avoided in the future. To describe the broader remedy, a discussion of the
and its role in transatlantic business
content of trade facilitation
365
transactions follows.
Facilitation of the trade in goods transpires under the auspices of
national customs administrations and international organizations.?
Among the international organizations specializing in trade facilitation are
the World Bank and the U.N. Centre for Trade Facilitation and Electronic
Business. 36 The World Bank initiates customs modernization programs in
a number of countries to foster development of customs administrations
capable of instituting WTO compliant procedures through technology to
assist in the importation of goods. 68 The U.N. Centre for Trade
Facilitation and Electronic Business is responsible for the Single
Administrative Document utilized by the EC. 369 Both of these
organizations are component parts of the Global Facilitation Partnership
for Transportation and Trade. 7 The Global Partnership incorporates
numerous organizations in a venture to provide modernization programs
to a variety of nations, as well as provoke discourse on policy mechanisms
a global system of trade under modem procedures
necessary to implement
37
and technology. '

availableat http://www.unece.org/trade/forums/forum02/docs/02tfbroch.pdf (last visited June 9,
2006).
365. On barriers to transatlantic partnerships between the United States and EC, see GREGORY
C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS PUBUC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LrIGATIoN 126-39
(2003).
366. See supra note 364; see also Gerard McLinden, Trade Facilitation:Progress and
ProspectsforDohaNegotiations,in Trade, Doha, and Development A Window into the Issues, 7585, 176-82 (Richard New Farmer ed., 2006).
367. See McLinden, supranote 366, at 180.
368. See generally CUSTOMS MODERNIZATION HANDBOOK (Luc De Wulf & Josd B. Sokol
eds., 2005); Trade Facilitation in the World Bank, availableat http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Topics/TFBrochurefebo5.pdf (last visited June 25, 2005).
369. See Mandate, Terms of Reference and Procedures for UN/CEFACT, TRADE/R.650/
Rev.3 (Aug. 18,2004), availableathttp://www.unece.org/cefact/r650rev3 .pdf(last visited June 25,
2005).
370. See generally Global Facilitation Partnership for Transportation and Trade Web Site,
http://www.gfptt.org/ (last visited June 25, 2005).
371. On the breadth of measures currently underway by members of the Global Partnership,
see WTO Secretariat, Note on TechnicalAssistance andCapacityBuildingon Trade Facilitation,
TN/TF/W/54 (July 21, 2005).
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479

Among the chief proponents of facilitation is the WCO.37 2 One of the
influential initiatives of the WCO is the International Convention on the
Simplification and Harmonization of Customs Procedures, or Revised
Kyoto Convention.373 The Convention is a comprehensive set of obligatory
standards for members to apply in all aspects of customs administration.374
The Convention contains twenty Articles describing the scope and
administrative functions of the Convention.375 These Articles are followed
by a General Annex consisting of ten chapters dealing exclusively with
definitions, standards, and recommended practices to be embodied in
national customs laws and their administration.37 6 The Convention

concludes with nine Specific Annexes, which address certain defined areas

of customs administration in greater detail.377 These Specific Annexes also
contain definitions, standards, and recommended practices.378 Although the
treaty is not presently in force, its principles guide the modem
administration of customs procedures.3 79
The WCO also recently promulgated a series of fundamental principles
governing trade facilitation. The Framework of Standards to Secure and
Facilitate Global Trade addresses a number of developments to modernize
national customs administrations with an inclusive view toward
administrative assistance to developing countries ° The 166 Members of

372. See WCO, Compendium ofWCO CapacityBuilding Tools, G/C/W445 (Dec. 12,2002);
WCO, Trade FacilitationIssues in the Doha MinisterialDeclarationReview of GATT'Articles,
G/C/W/392, IN 2-7 (July 11, 2002) [hereinafter Trade FacilitationIssues].
373. See Trade FacilitationIssues, supranote 372, M11-25, Annex I-II (July 11,2002). This
convention amends the currently in force International Convention on the Simplification and
Harmonization of Customs Procedures, May 18, 1973, 950 U.N.T.S. 270. See also Sean Murphy,
Amendment ofthe Treaty on the SimplificationandHarmonizationofCustoms Procedures,98 AM.
J. INT'L L. 843 (2004) (discussing protocol amending treaty whose text is found at Protocol of
Amendment to International Convention on Simplification and Harmonization of Customs
Procedures, June 26, 1999, S. TREATY Doc. 108-6, at 9 (2003) and indicating the President of the
United States condones the Protocol's adoption).
374. See LYONS, supranote 40, at 7-11 (describing components of Revised Kyoto Convention
and previously enforced Kyoto Convention).
375. Convention text, availableat http://www.wcoomd.orglie/En/Topics-Issues/Facilitation
CustomsProcedures/KyotoNew/Content/content.htm (last visited June 23, 2005).
376. See id.
377. See id
378. See id
379. See WCO General Secretariat, PositionRatifications andAccessions, Aug. 13, 2004,
PGO087E1 (2004) (prior Kyoto Convention remains presently in force), available at
http://www.wcoomd.org/ie/En/Conventions/PG0087E.pdf (last visited June 21, 2005).
380. WCO, Framework of Standards To Secure and Facilitate Global Trade (2005)
[hereinafter WCO Framework], available at www.customs.treas.gov/linkhandler/cgov/import
communications_toindustry/wco_framework.cttlwcoframework.pdf(last visited July 22,2005).
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the WTO "adopted" the Framework on June 24, 2005, which rests upon
two "pillars" of "Customs-to-Customs network arraignments and
Particularly, the Framework
Customs-to-Business partnerships."'
confirms the need to ease transit of legitimate trade by removal of
technical, procedural, and technological barriers.3 82 Accomplishment of
global trade facilitation occurs through "integrated supply chain
management" or use of electronic documentation to prescreen imports to
alleviate the necessity to physically inspect every shipment entering
national territories.38 3 The Framework represents a large step forward in
concretely promoting trade facilitation, but falls short of a comprehensive
treaty encompassing global harmonization of customs procedures.3
The above measures compliment the WTO's Doha Agenda, which
mandates discussion of trade facilitation.385 The WTO recognizes the
importance of reducing unnecessary burdens upon importers to ease
transport of goods into a Member's territory and ultimately to the
consumer.38 6 Illustrative of the significance of trade facilitation, WTO
Members, in the "July Decision," agreed to table discussion of such
essential topics as trade and investment, trade in competition policy, and
transparency in government procurement in favor of a singular dialogue
381
on trade facilitation. Members have submitted numerous suggestions on
necessary measures to realize the global goal of universal facilitation in
trade mechanisms.388 Proposals for a WTO Agreement on Trade
Facilitation have been received, but a lack of consensus on the integral
381. Id. 1.4; Message from the Commissioner of Customs and Border Patrol, Historic
Adoption of the Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade, June, 24, 2005,
available at http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/commissioner/messages/historic_
adoption.xml (last visited July 23, 2005) (announcing adoption of Framework and praising
standards). The International Chamber of Commerce Customs Guidelines, available at
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statementsLrnles/statements/2003/customsuidelinesasp (last visited
July 27, 2005).
382. See supranote 381.
383. WCO Framework, supra note 380, Annex 1.
384. The WCO Framework adopts a gradual approach to overall facilitation, and is not atreaty
itself. Id.
385. Trade facilitation is one ofthe "Singapore Issues," adopted by WTO Members. See Draft
Ministerial Text, Second Revision, JOB(03)/150/Rev.2 (Sept. 13, 2003).
386. See McLinden, supra note 366, at 176, 179-80.
387. WTO Council Decision of Aug. 1, 2004, WT/L/579, 1 (d), (g) (Aug. 2, 2004). The
Decision asserts, except for trade facilitation, "no work towards negotiations on any of these
[Singapore] issues will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round." Id. See generally
WTO SECRETARIAT, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2005).
388. See WTO Secretariat, Negotiating Group on Trade Facilitation-Clarificationand
Improvement ofGA TTArticles V VIII andX-Compilation ofProposalsMade by WTO Members,
TN/TF/W/43/Rev. 1 (July 20,2005).
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measures darkens the prospects for such an Agreement's institution in the
near future.389
The United States and India submitted a far-reaching proposal calling
for the establishment of a "multilateral mechanism for the exchange and
handling of information between Members.""39 The proposal focuses on
implementation of"a mechanism that is practical and effective, involving
a commitment pertaining to (1) a defined universe of information, (2) a
practical basis for exchange that is efficient and not burdensome, and (3)
a structure for information exchange that is forward-looking .... ,391 The
Communication articulates adherence to the WCO's Framework discussed
above, particularly adoption of the electronic prescreening model to
transmit "information consisting of the 'documentation' or data elements
that relate to the movement of goods across a border" to the national
customs authority responsible for approving the importer's entry of the
goods. 39 2 Finally, proposal of the mechanism seeks to underpin current
bilateral instruments.393
Given the breadth of organizations addressing the subject of trade
facilitation, the two leading trade blocs (the United States and the EC)
have an opportunity to lead by example. Indeed, the United States and
EC's New Transatlantic Agenda confirms the two bear "a special
responsibility to lead multilateral efforts towards a more open world
system of trade and investment." 394 Noting the United States and India
proposal for a trade mechanism that underpins existing bilateral treaty
regimes, the United States and EC could provide a bilateral model of a
trade facilitative convention.395
389. See Peter Sutherland, TheDohaDevelopmentAgenda:PoliticalChallengesto the World
TradingSystem-A Cosmopolitan Perspective, 8 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 363, 367, 375 (2005) (noting
immense challenge facing negotiators in the revised Doha Agenda and cost assessment necessary
to achieve facilitation).
390. See Communication from India and the United States, Proposalon the Establishmentof
a MultilateralMechanismfor the Exchange ofInformation Between Members, TN/TF/W/57 (July

22, 2005).
391. Id. 6.
392. Id. 5 (documentation consists of"name ofimporting or exporting party, origin ofgoods,
description of goods, HS classification, declared value, shipper").
393. Id. 2.
394. The New Transatlantic Agenda, available at http://europa.eu.int/cgi-bin/etal.pl (last
visited July 23, 2005) (Agenda contains a "Joint EU/U.S. Action Plan" containing specific
reference to leading the WTO in opening markets to trade and investment).
395. Accord Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Economics
Department, The Benefits of Liberalizing Product Markets and Reducing Barriers to International
Trade and Investment: The Case ofthe United States and the European Union, ECO/WKP(2005)19
(May 26, 2005), availableat http://www.olis.oed.org/olis/2005doc.nsfflinkto/ECO-WKP(2005)19
(last visited July 23, 2005) (arguing reduced tariff, competition, and foreign direct investment
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Given the rise of bilateral free trade agreements, the United States and
the EC have an opportunity to execute a bilateral treaty on customs
procedures and enforcement with provision for uniform classification
decisions and mechanisms for enforcement. 3 There exists a need for
convergence rather than estrangement between the United States and the

EC.39 7 A bilateral treaty amalgamates American and European interests in
trade facilitation and provides a framework to resolve technical disputes
quickly without the need to expand de facto WTO enforcement
mechanisms to include alteration of Member's judicial structures.
Cooperation between the world's greatest trading blocs ensures joint
prosperity. Further, harmonization of procedures for the importation of
goods permits close cooperation between customs authorities, which is
vital not only to facilitate trade in goods, but to carry out the police
functions of customs authorities. Additionally, the agreement would serve
as a basis for a larger multilateral instrument, as envisaged by the WTO
Members.39 '
The basis for a bilateral convention between the United States and EC
exists under the auspices of the Transatlantic Economic Partnership and
Transatlantic Business Dialog.399 In 1996, the United States and EC
executed an agreement on mutual assistance and cooperation in customs
matters.' That agreement affirmed a "commitment to the facilitation of
the legitimate movement of goods and.., exchange [of] information...
and expertise on measures to improve customs.., procedures.., and

barriers would benefit both the United States and the EC). Cf ADAM S. POSEN, FLEETING
EQUALITY: THE RELATIVE SIZE OF THE U.S. AND EU ECONOMIES TO 2020 (Brooking Institute Sept.
2004) (arguing U.S. economy will be nearly 20% bigger than the enlarged European economy in
2020), available atwww.brookings.edu/fp/cuseanalysis/posen2004O90

.htm (last visited July 23,

2005).
396. See generally Jo-Ann Crawford & Roberto V. Fiorentino, The Changing Landscape of

Regional Trade Agreements, WTO Discussion Paper No. 8, at 1-4, 8-15 (2005) (describing
extensive coverage of diverse areas under trade agreements and EC's predominance in trade
agreements currently in-force).
397. The United States and EC recognized the need to "strengthen the multilateral trading
system and take concrete, practical steps to promote closer economic relations between us." The
New Transatlantic Agenda, available at http://europa.eu.int/cgi-bin/etal.pl (last visited July 23,
2005).
398. Accord Crawford & Fiorentino, supra note 396 (advocating trade agreements if their
provisions can be incorporated into the multilateral trading system).
399. See Transatlantic Economic Partnership: Action Plan of Nov. 9, 1998, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/usa/indexen.htm (last visited July 22,
2005) (agreement between the United States and the EC to strengthen their economic relationships).
400. Agreement Between the European Communities and the United States of America on
Customs Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters, Nov. 7, 1996, available at
http://www.useu.be/DOCS/custagl196.html (last visited July 23, 2005).
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computerized systems.. ."0' Further, the agreement enshrined a commitment for both parties' customs authorities to ensure mutual compliance
with customs laws and procedures. 2
On the basis of the agreement, a new bilateral convention covering
both exchange of information and enforcement of customs laws and
harmonization of tariff classification of goods may result. In exploiting
mutual assistance between the American and EC customs authorities, a
uniform system of classification may occur under the auspices of
harmonizing the tariff schedules of these two trading blocs. Because the
United States and the EC share use of the Harmonized System, each need
only coordinate its explanatory notes and subheadings to produce a
uniform tariff classification schedule.
To accomplish total uniformity in goods classification, a tiered
approach permits incremental phasing out of the separate tariff
schedules. °3 If the bilateral convention operates on a ten year schedule for
total integration, then benchmarks of three year periods of review and
adjustment allows the customs authorities to set substantive milestones in
amalgamating their distinctive schedules. Any such instrument must
incorporate a single electronic customs declaration admissible throughout
the United States and the EC.
Coupled with the single electronic declaration, a centralized
classification body must oversee implementation of the uniform tariff
schedule. This centralized body should consist of a professional staff
supported by an administration versed in the technical aspects of customs
classification. In a sense, the centralized body would be a permanent panel
of experts with authority to issue final goods classifications binding upon
both the United States and all EC Member States customs authorities.
Disputes, if any, should be decided by the centralized panel of experts
in order to ensure practical uniform enforcement of one classification for
particular goods. Nonetheless, to ensure independent review, a solitary
appeal to either the Court of International Trade for American importers
or the European Court of Justice for European importers should lie. A
notification system should notice judicial bodies of appeals in each
chamber to ensure duplicity of efforts is avoided.
Decision on appeal occurs under appellate rules contained in the
bilateral convention. A jurisprudence based upon the same convention

401. Id. art. 7.
402. Id. art. 11.
403. The tiered approach to tariff elimination occurs in the North American Free Trade
Agreement's Article 302 and Annex 302.2. North American Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 289 (entered into force, Jan. 1, 1994).
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should avoid disparate rulings from these two judicial bodies. The bilateral
convention, or more properly a transatlantic customs code, provides a
viable solution to the current dispute and serves the interests of facilitating
trade, while ensuring trade in goods between the United States and the EC
transpires under a harmonious classification regime and enforcement
mechanism.
V. CONCLUSIONS

This work suggests two concurrent solutions to disputes similar to the
present dispute between the United States and the EC. First, a disparity in
the text of Article X:3(a) and Article XXVI:8(a)(ii) may be resolved
through a separate Agreement between WTO Members on the meaning of
the two provisions in relation to each other. Such an Agreement should
adopt the phraseology of prior GATT panel decisions announcing a
standard of substantially uniform administration of a Member's trade
regulations. Second, in the interests of trade facilitation, the United States
and the EC should execute and adopt a bilateral treaty encompassing a
transatlantic customs code harmonizing customs classification procedures,
tariff schedules, and enforcement mechanisms.
These two proposed solutions, within the modem landscape of
international trade, can be accomplished. In an environment charged with
a desire to achieve global facilitation in trade, these solutions harness the
capabilities of the main trading blocs and recognize the strength of the
United States and EC to proactively lead the project of global integration
of trade. Through partnership, private enterprise in both territories thrives.
Projecting a well-defined bilateral organization onto the multilateral
trading system will encourage corporate confidence and increase access to
the global market by a greater number of enterprises.
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